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Abstract 
We propose that the extent to which political parties are institutionalized shapes welfare state 
development. Institutionalized parties allow politicians to overcome coordination problems, 
avoid capture by special interests, and form stable linkages with broad social groups. These 
features both enable and incentivize politicians to pursue generous and universal welfare policies. 
Employing recent measures of party institutionalization and welfare law features, we test 
implications from our argument on data covering 169 countries and extending back to 1900. 
Even when accounting for country- and year-fixed effects and institutional features such as 
electoral system, regime type and state capacity, we find robust evidence that party 
institutionalization leads to more extensive, universal, and generous welfare arrangements. The 
relationship is more pronounced in democracies, but exists also in autocracies. When 
disaggregating party institutionalization and evaluating mechanisms, the linkages that 
institutionalized parties form with social groups constitute one important, but not the only 
relevant, factor. 
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1. Introduction 
We argue that political parties more strongly prefer and have better capabilities to provide 
encompassing, generous, and universal welfare policies if they are highly institutionalized. By 
detailing this argument and putting its implications through demanding tests on extensive data 
material, we link different central patterns observed by scholars of political development: 
One key feature of political development during the 20th century was the increased 
prevalence of policies pertaining to most, if not all, citizens within the boundaries of the state. 
From education to health care to pensions, new policies arose to cover needs of the broader 
population, and not only narrow elite groups or people living in a particular region (Huntington, 
1968; Lindert, 2004). Policies, in various areas, turned more universal. Concurrently, politics in many 
countries also turned more universal, both regarding which social groups participated in public 
decision making and regarding geographical scope, with a shift in emphasis from the local to the 
national level in many countries (see Somanathan 2001). The capacity of many states increased 
(Fukuyama, 2015), suffrage was expanded (also in countries where elections were far from free 
and fair; e.g., Miller, 2015) and new constitutions and various national-level institutions were 
developed (e.g., Elkins, 2010). Key in this process was the development of political parties 
competing and otherwise operating on the national arena, both in democratic (e.g., Mainwaring & 
Scully, 1995; Schattschneider, 1942) and many autocratic countries (e.g., Geddes, 1999; Magaloni, 
2006).  
Despite these broad trends, countries across the world differ in the scope and depth of 
universalistic policy making (Mares & Carnes, 2009; Scruggs & Allan, 2008). Differences in 
national-level institutions, such as competitive elections and franchise rights (e.g., Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Lindert, 2004), the electoral system (e.g., Jurado & Leon, 
Forthcoming; Persson & Tabellini, 2004; Rogowski, 1987), or state and administrative quality 
(e.g., Orloff & Skocpol, 1984; Rothstein, Samanni, & Teorell, 2012) help explain this variation. 
Adding to these insights, we highlight that features of political parties also play a key role:   
Party institutionalization, we argue, enables parties to widen their circle of constituents, 
elicit and aggregate information about constitutents’ demands, and bargain and overcome veto 
players inside and outside the party organization. These features shape both the incentives and the 
capabilities of parties to adopt universal social policies (in different areas). Our proposed 
mechanisms involve both “bottom-up” processes, related to how institutionalized parties filter 
information and aggregate the preferences of broad constituencies into national politics, and “top 
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down processes”, related to how such parties transform local demand into national policy 
solutions and effectively implement these, even in the face of opposition by narrow interest 
groups.  
In proposing our argument, we pursue an institutionalist approach that combines meso-
level theorizing – centering on the institutions of parties, the incentives of politicians, and their 
relationships with key constituencies – with macro-level implications. Building on previous work 
on candidate capture by narrow or local interests (Ehrlich, 2007; Martin & Swank, 2008), 
dominant regime parties (Kim & Gandhi, 2010; Magaloni, 2006), programmatic versus 
clientelistic party linkages (Kitschelt, 2000; Shefter, 1977), and risk as a source of welfare demand 
(Moene & Wallerstein, 2001), we develop a novel argument on how institutionalized national 
parties contribute to encompassing (in terms of risk areas covered), universal, and generous 
welfare states.  
Recent datasets with relevant measures of party institutionalization and of national welfare 
policies allows for testing our hypotheses on extensive data material – covering most countries 
globally, back to 1900. Thus, we can also investigate how well the theorized relationships travels 
across space and time, and conduct demanding tests by, e.g., controlling for country- and year-
fixed effects. The relationships between party institutionalization, on the one hand, and 
encompassing, universal and generous welfare state policies, on the other, turn out highly robust. 
They also appear strong in quite different contexts, including in both democratic and autocratic 
regimes, although the relationship is stronger in democracies. The results hold up when 
accounting for different plausible alternative explanations, for example concerning how electoral 
systems, working class parties and organizations, civil society participation, or state capacity shape 
welfare state development.  
In Section 2 we discuss the concept of party institutionalization and review relevant 
literature, before we detail our argument. In Section 3 we describe data sources, measures, and 
research design. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis, whereas Section 5 concludes with a 
discussion on how our study contributes to hitherto distinct literatures.  
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2. Theory 
Party institutionalization 
The literature on political parties distinguishes two key aspects of party systems, namely their 
internal and external characteristics (see Bernhard et al., 2016, p. 5). The external dimension is 
often captured by the concept of “party system institutionalization” (e.g., Hicken, Kuhonta, & 
Weiss, 2015) highlighting features such as how stably aligned voters and legislators are to 
particular parties. We focus here on the internal dimension, often referred to as “party 
institutionalization”.  
When parties are institutionalized, decisions within parties are taken according to clear, 
stable rules and informed through well-organized contact points and networks linking party elites 
with broad constituencies outside the core organization. Thus party institutionalization implies 
the allocation of decision making power to core, national-level party institutions, well-specified 
and organizationally determined roles for decision-makers, hierarchical arrangements that allow, 
e.g., for disciplining actors that stray from the party line, organizational complexity that allows for 
division of labor and effective outreach to different geographical areas, and mass constituencies 
aligned with the party through relatively stable forms of linkages, typically built around a clearly 
expressed policy program.  
Optimally, measures of party institutionalization should reflect this broad and multi-
faceted concept (and that parties could score relatively low/high on different features). More 
specifically, measures should capture 1) different features of party organizations, including the 
core national organization and the existence of branches operating throughout the territory, 2) 
how parties function in coordinating and disciplining key actors aligning with the party and 3) 
how parties link up to constituencies outside the core organization. (We return to issues of 
measurement in Section 3).  
When parties lack these traits, we consider them to have low degrees of 
institutionalization, and decision-making power thus rests elsewhere than in the party 
organization, typically in the hands of particular individuals or narrow social groups. (The same 
holds true also in polities that lack political parties entirely). One example is “personalized rule” 
(e.g., Geddes 1999) where the leader, and his/her closest friends and family, sometimes exercise 
power in a near-monopolistic manner, even if the leader formally belongs to a political party (see 
also Bernhard et al. 2016). 
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As Bernhard et al. (2016) observe, studies on parties, party systems and 
institutionalization occur in two largely parallel literatures on parties in democracies and 
autocracies, respectively. Regarding the first, political scientists have long proposed that parties 
play crucial roles in affecting the functioning and stability of democracies (see, e.g., Huntington, 
1968; Schattschneider, 1942). More recent work has highlighted how parties shape economic and 
other policies, also those pertaining to public goods provision (Croissant & Volkel, 2012; Hicken, 
Kollman, & Simmons, 2016; Hicken & Simmons, 2008; Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt & Kselman, 
2013; Levitsky, 1998; Randall & Svåsand, 2002). Indeed, a handful of studies have studied 
features of parties, in democracies, and outcomes fairly closely related to those we analyze below: 
While studying the nationalization of party systems (in terms of their distribution of votes across 
the territory) rather than the institutionalization of parties, Jurado (2014) finds that this feature 
relates positively to social spending. Further, the domination of parties by activist as opposed to 
leadership has been linked to welfare state retrenchment (Schumacher, 2012; Schumacher, De 
Vries, & Vis, 2013).  
Regarding the second literature, several studies propose that parties in autocracies have 
important consequences for outcomes such as political stability and regime change (e.g., Boix & 
Svolik, 2013; Brancati, 2014; Brownlee, 2009; Magaloni, 2006; Svolik, 2012). Further, (regime) 
party features influence which policies are pursued, and subsequent outcomes in areas such as 
investment or economic growth (Gehlbach & Keefer, 2011; Keefer, 2007; Wright, 2008).  
Yet, we follow Bernhard et al. (2016), who study the relationship between strong parties 
and economic growth, in contending that – at an abstract level – many (though not all) features 
associated with party institutionalization are fairly comparable across (regime) contexts and may 
have quite similar effects on policy-making. As we expand on below, we expect that some of the 
noted features of party institutionalization affect welfare state policies in the same direction in 
both democracies and autocracies, while other features should play a more prominent role in 
democracies. Yet, we highlight that our theory moves at a general level, and that we do not 
exclude that there are other, relevant moderating factors, such as governing party ideology.1 
																																								 																				
1 In general, “left-leaning” parties in government may be more eager to expand welfare state arrangements. But, 
some of the mechanisms that we discuss below are expectedly at work also for institutionalized “right-wing” parties 
that form linkages with fairly broad social groups (in addition to rich, narrow groups such as large-scale landowners). 
Especially for life-course related risks such as old-age or sickness, both low and high income workers are likely to 
demand insurance (Esping-Andersen, 1999); employees are likely to become sick or old (unlike, e.g., unemployment 
risks which are more class- or occupation-dependent). Hence not only working-class parties face demands to 
introduce welfare policies.  We leave a thorough discussion and systematic study of moderating factors pertaining to 
ideology and identities of social groups to future research. But, we account for, e.g., government ideology in our 
robustness tests. 
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The incentives and capabilities of parties to pursue social policies 
Citizens face various types of economic risks, particularly as workers: Since most people are risk 
averse they often prefer policy-makers to alleviate these risks (see, e.g., Moene and Wallerstein 
2001). With comprehensive social and economic developments – such as industrialization, 
urbanization and the opening up of closed sectors to trade – often come demands that parties 
implement policies to deal with the increased risks that these processes entail (Mares, 2005). 
These demands can, however, be met by quite different kinds of policies. For example, demands 
for parties to deal with risks related to involuntary unemployment can be met by local constricted 
schemes, such as workfare programs at the municipality level. Alternatively, policy-makers can 
introduce national schemes, thus also covering citizens living in areas where local schemes are 
not adopted. We discuss below how political parties vary in their incentives to create national 
welfare states that encompass multiple risks and in how capable they are in effectively 
implementing them.  
Yet, even if parties decide that a nation-wide social policy is desirable, the choice of who is 
to benefit remains. Should the program only cover a specific part of the workforce (such as public 
servants or manufacturing workers in one sector), should it be means-tested and strictly targeted 
to the poor, or should benefits accrue to all citizens? When political parties depend on narrow 
interests for electoral success or, more generally, for maintaining office, a relatively effective 
strategy is to introduce particularistic policy measures that channel resources to these groups 
instead of universal measures (which advantage also large groups of politically irrelevant citizens). 
This logic is applicable to a range of policies (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003), but social policy 
programs are particularly relevant instances (see Knutsen & Rasmussen, fortchoming). Parties 
with broader constituencies should, everything else equal, prefer more universal programs than 
parties relying on narrower constituencies, either geographically – in which case local programs 
may be preferred – or particular social groups – in which case national programs may be targeted 
on these groups (e.g., Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Knutsen & Rasmussen, fortchoming; Shefter, 
1977).  
In addition to the preferences over policy designs, the capacity of political actors to develop 
and implement effective policies matters for outcomes. While a party might want to focus on 
national solutions to work-life risks, it could still be unable to pursue such policies effectively. 
There may be different reasons for this, including a lack of capacity to control the behavior of 
candidates, who sometimes face strong incentives to renegade from the party line (Ansolabehere, 
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Snyder, & Stewart, 2001), or an insufficient organizational apparatus for eliciting information 
about what a viable policy design looks like in practice.  
Given these hurdles, we cannot assume that all parties are likely to favor, or have the 
ability to handle, various citizens’ demands for risk-mitigating schemes through national-level 
universal social policies (see also Kitschelt 2015). Moreover, even in cases where broad-based 
coverage of various risks is in place, the generosity of the program can vary dramatically. In some 
instance de jure, programs may either be de facto inoperative or only channel limited resources to 
those formally entitled to benefits (Rasmussen, 2016). Below, we detail how differences in party 
institutionalization contribute to explain variation in the extensiveness, universality, and 
generosity of national welfare policies. 
 
Why institutionalized parties lead to welfare state development 
Our theory consists of two parts, and both link (different) features of party institutionalization to 
the incentives and capacities of parties to pursue universal welfare policies in various areas. In the 
first, “bottom-up” part of the argument, we focus on how demands from groups of citizens are 
aggregated up into the party system. We also discuss how demands from organized interests such 
as unions or employer associations will be treated differently depending on level of party 
institutionalization. The second, “top-down” part addresses how institutionalized parties can 
override particular political elites or social groups that may act as veto players (e.g., Huber and 
Stephens 2001; Tsebelis 2002) on implementing comprehensive (and expensive) welfare 
legislation.  
Regarding bottom-up mechanisms, parties differ in how well they can predict and 
aggregate voter preferences (see, e.g., Kim & Gandhi, 2010; Magaloni, 2006). We highlight how 
institutionalized parties establish local branches and linkages with civil organizations such as trade 
unions or religious organizations. These formal organizational and network features are vital for 
effectively catching and interpreting the needs and demands of broad (and quite different) groups 
of citizens. Institutionalized parties, in both autocratic and democratic contexts, tend to establish 
such linkages, even if the more specific motivation for the party could be co-optation of 
potentially revolting industrial workers under autocracy and voter mobilization under democracy 
(Kim & Gandhi 2010, 648). Let us elaborate: 
Parties with extensive systems for preference aggregation are more likely to register 
signals from a broad array of groups. When parties create strong national organizations and 
	
	
9 
extensive local branches, they become identifiable focal points for members and various voters, 
enabling parties to interact also with disadvantaged groups of workers such as land workers or 
unskilled urban workers in service industries (such groups are numerous in most countries, see 
Ansell & Samuels, 2014). Institutionalized parties are also likely to establish connections to broad 
civil society organizations, one example being trade unions, allowing these organizations to signal 
their preferences (Kitschelt 2013). When parties have weak preference aggregation systems (or 
when parties are absent), the voices of less resourceful citizens tend to go unnoticed. In the 
absence of strong national organizations and local branches, parties are less likely to learn the 
preferences of citizens in diverse and distant regions, allowing elite groups with more resources, 
who presumably do not want to pay for universal and generous social policy programs, to 
overshadow broader and less resourceful groups (see, e.g., Przeworski, 2010).  
Given the accountability links between political agents and voters – especially the need 
for broad support to win re-election in competitive multi-party contests – we anticipate such 
bottom-up mechanisms to be particularly strong for institutionalized parties in democracies. Yet, 
as we discuss below, we anticipate them to be at work (although to a lesser extent) also in 
autocratic contexts.   
Demands from the local interests must, however, be adjusted and weighted against the 
ideological position of the party as whole. Institutionalized parties will try to represent different 
local groups, but do so with national solutions (Hicken, Kollman, & Simmons, 2016). This 
expectation partly stems from the notion that institutionalized parties with local organizations are 
better able to separate signals from noise, and their information-processing capacities make them 
less likely to overly focus on one particular signal. Organizational complexity, in the form of 
permanent, strong local and national organizations and dense civil society connections, are vital 
for parties to be informed by, and be able to aggregate, the preferences of various unorganized 
and organized interests.  
Conversely, absent any form of parties linking leaders to the preferences of mass 
constituencies, such as under many monarchical or military regimes, or when party organizations 
are weak, leaders may prefer discretionary spending on private goods to their narrow support 
coalition (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). Welfare policies in instances of low party institutionalization 
should thus be non-existent, or, when they exist, concentrated to key, narrow groups that the 
regime truly needs to co-opt, such as military officers. 
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Regarding top-down mechanisms, they relate to the importance of party 
institutionalization for effectively disciplining individual candidates as well as overpowering – or 
striking deals with – powerful social groups opposing the introduction of welfare schemes.  
In many political systems, several politicians or social groups have the standing to de facto 
veto legislation or implementation of new policies that do not serve their interests (e.g., Ehrlich, 
2007; Tsebelis, 2002). One example of a group that could lose out from the enactment of, e.g., a 
universal unemployment benefits system is large-scale landowners, who anticipate taking much of 
the associated tax burden but little of the benefits (Ansell & Samuels 2014). Individual members 
of parliament (MP) with a formal affiliation to a party, but with an independent power base and 
diverging policy preferences, can also act as veto players. When facing such MPs, who often 
prefer working for targeted policies benefiting their personal constituency, the ability to call on 
party discipline is key for enabling national and universal policy solutions.  
How can parties, which may gain electoral or other benefits from pursuing universal 
welfare policies, overcome such veto players? We propose several mechanisms through which 
institutionalized parties can overcome resistant social groups or individual politicians with strong 
incentives to stray from the party line (see also Bernhard et al. 2016):  
First, institutionalized parties should avoid renegade politicians through screening 
candidates according to, e.g., their ideological position and tendency to be opportunistic. Well-
established, party-centered selection processes, focusing on shared ideology, should help in 
ensuring party unity (Carreras, 2012). Second, institutionalized parties are enduring. Insofar as 
this is known by all relevant actors, political actions should be taken with at least one eye towards 
their long-term consequences. When this is combined with a well-functioning organizational 
apparatus, which provides fora for bargaining and tools for subsequent monitoring, party leaders, 
individual politicians and other powerful actors can strike comprehensive “deals that involve 
intertemporal tradeoffs and [enforce] those deals through time” (Bernhard et al., 2016, p. 8; see 
also Boix & Svolik, 2013; Gerring & Thacker, 2004; Hicken & Simmons, 2008; Svolik, 2008).2 
Thus, even if individual parliamentarians, for example elected from very wealthy or rural districts, 
should oppose comprehensive, universal welfare legislation, a stable institutionalized party may 
																																								 																				
2  In democracies, institutionalized parties adopting long time-horizons may also affect whether future welfare 
payments are perceived as credibly by voters. If voters can choose between receiving an immediate good (e.g., 
reduced taxes or discretionary short-term payments) or an insurance against some possible future risk (a welfare 
benefit), the credibility of the promises of the latter is key (Iversen, 2005). If parties are either unable to carry forth 
policy promises, or can be easily swayed to shift policy, voters will have little incentives to vote for parties that 
promise future welfare benefits; parties that promise, e.g., tax reductions are more likely to be the preferred 
alternative. This suggests that institutionalized parties (in democracies) have stronger electoral incentives to expand 
welfare programs than non-institutionalized parties 
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allow party leaders to bring on board such politicians by credibly promising other policy- or 
personal gains. In sum, institutionalized parties should be better able to overcome veto points 
and build broad coalitions behind generous, universal welfare policies.  
Finally, institutionalized parties, with their streamlined national and subnational 
organizational apparatuses, help with effectively implement comprehensive welfare policies. We 
discussed above how institutionalized parties can elicit and process information from different 
groups. The very same informational capacity, resting in effective operations on the ground and a 
well-functioning national organization to aggregate information, should allow institutionalized 
parties to transform these demands into policies that are amenable to effective implementation, 
for example by taking into consideration different practical obstacles for registration of 
beneficiaries and monitoring of payments. Conversely, if weakly institutionalized parties 
anticipate that they lack the informational and organizational apparatus for properly designing 
and implementing (costly) welfare schemes, they may not risk their “political capital” on such 
ventures. 
 
Expectations and scope conditions    
The discussion above suggests three general hypotheses: 
H1) Countries where parties are generally more institutionalized develop more encompassing (in 
terms of risks areas covered) welfare states than countries with less institutionalized (or no) 
parties. 
H2) Countries where parties are generally more institutionalized develop more universal welfare 
policies than countries with less institutionalized (or no) parties. 
H3) Countries where parties are generally more institutionalized develop more generous welfare 
policies than countries with less institutionalized (or no) parties. 
While our theoretical argument suggests that party institutionalization should affect the 
three features of welfare states in tandem, testing the three hypotheses separately provides a 
stronger overall test for our argument. It is less likely that any spurious factor should drive three 
relationships, which are all predicted by our theory, than one (specific or composite) relationship. 
The “standard context” studied by the welfare state literature is the early industrialized 
and highly developed OECD democracies (see Haggard and Kaufmann 2008). Much of this 
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literature has focused on working class parties (and trade unions) as agents of welfare state 
development, and is inextricably linked to the historical rise of these organizations and 
movements in these mostly Western European countries. 3  Yet, the differences in party 
organization, stability and links to voters that we have highlighted differ, and should matter, both 
within developed and developing countries.  
The features of parties that we focus on differ also between relatively democratic regimes 
and between relatively autocratic regimes. Yet, we anticipate that the theorized relationships 
between party institutionalization and welfare state features should be somewhat stronger in 
democracies than in autocracies. Some of the proposed bottom-up mechanisms presumably 
operate more strongly in democracies, as the fortunes of politicians are more clearly linked to 
demands by broad groups of constituents through contested elections. Still, many autocratic 
regimes hold multi-party elections, and although these elections are not always contested (e.g., 
Levitsky & Way, 2010) autocratic regime parties still care about mass demands for various 
reasons (see, e.g., Miller, 2015; Wintrobe, 1998). For example, industrial workers constitute one 
group has strong mobilization capacity (Kim & Gandhi 2010) and could spearhead revolutions if 
disgruntled. Further, we fail to see any clear reason for why the top-down mechanisms should 
differ much between democratic and autocratic settings. For these reasons, we anticipate party 
institutionalization to matter for welfare state development also in autocracies. 
We have thus laid out a theory of party institutionalization and welfare state features that 
should be relevant across different contexts (although we can certainly not exclude that there are 
relevant moderating factors, e.g. related to ideology or the specific identity of social groups 
linking up with institutionalized parties, as discussed). Hence, we will empirically assess our 
theory by employing samples that pool historical information from all countries with available 
information. Yet, this also makes it incumbent on us to assess empirically how generalizable our 
argument seems to be.  While we cannot assess all relevant moderating factors, in part due to lack 
of comparable, cross-national data, we test for several relevant contextual factors that could 
moderate the proposed relationships between party institutionalization and welfare state features.   
 
 
																																								 																				
3 Yet, even within this group of countries, the worker movements (comprising both unions and social-democratic 
parties) have never been strong enough to single-handedly shape politics (Bartolini, 2000). Still, even in states with 
few or weak left governments, universal welfare policies have been introduced to a surprisingly large degree, and the 
introduction of universal welfare arrangements in Scandinavia preceded the electoral rise of the left  (Baldwin, 1990). 
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3. Data and Empirical Specification 
Party institutionalization index  
We employ the V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index (PI) as our key independent variable. PI 
is presented in detail and validated in Bizzarro et al. (2017). Briefly, PI records features of the 
main parties in a political system (easing comparisons between, e.g., one- and multi-party 
systems), and assessments are thus made at the country-level. PI aims to capture “1) the scope of 
party institutionalization in a country, 2) the proportion of parties that reach a threshold of 
minimal institutionalization, and 3) variations in the depth of this institutionalization – focusing 
on the links parties establish with voters and elites.” (Bizzarro et al. 2017: 2).  
Being part of V-dem, PI covers more than 170 countries (see Coppedge et al., 2016a,b), 
with time series from 1900 to the present. V-Dem indicators are typically coded by five country 
experts on ordinal five-point scales (see Appendix Table A1 for question wording), before final 
scores, at the interval level, are aggregated by the V-Dem measurement model. This model 
leverages various types of information to account for differential item functioning and ensure 
cross-coder consistency, as well as cross-country and inter-temporal comparability (see Pemstein 
et al. 2017).   
More specifically, PI draws on five indicators (Bizzarro et al., 2017: 6-9). v2psorgs, 
considers how many parties have permanent organizations. v2psprbrch considers number of parties 
with permanent local party branches. v2psplats concerns how many parties have publicly available, 
and distinct, party platforms (manifestos). v2pscohesv assesses the degree of party legislative 
cohesion, capturing the extent to which political elites submit to the position of their parties 
when voting on important bills. Finally, v2psprlnks considers the most common form of linkage 
between parties and their constituents, with clientelistic linkages assumed to signal a low degree 
of party institutionalization and programmatic policy linkages, assumed to reflect high party 
institutionalization.4  
PI is aggregated by summing across standardized versions of these five indicators, and 
then normalizing the resulting additive measure to 0–1 by using its cumulative density function. 
An additive index allows for partial substitutability between indicators, meaning that a low value 
																																								 																				
4 Including the indicator on party-constituent linkages allows capturing the extent to which parties are firmly rooted 
as mass parties with (stable) links to wider constituencies, core to our argument (and the concept of party 
institutionalization; see Bizzaro et al., 2016 for a discussion). Yet, we discuss below how this indicator might generate 
concerns about conceptual overlap with our dependent variable, and conduct tests that purge the relationship for its 
impact. 
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on one indicator can be compensated, but only partly, by high values on other (Goertz, 2006). 
The aggregation thus reflects our argument in that different aspects of party institutionalization, 
such as a strong central organization or stable links with mass constituencies, may have some 
independent effects on the outcomes of interest.5 
Figure 1 shows that (average) party institutionalization increased throughout the 20th 
century, but at different speeds – and starting from different levels – in different regions. Western 
Europe and North America have historically displayed comparatively high levels, and Africa and 
the Middle East comparatively low. East and South-East Asia experienced sharp increases after 
WWII, whereas Latin America experienced its sharpest increase in PI in the 1980s. Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia has experienced several periods of declining PI. When considering 
between-country- and within-country variation over time, the pattern is even more mixed. Figure 
2 displays PI for four countries, from different regions, with very dissimilar trajectories. Norway 
has had high and fairly stable scores across the time series. The Philippines, in contrast, has 
experienced relatively low levels of PI, especially during American colonial rule and Japanese 
occupation, but also decades later during Marcos’ strong-man rule. While PI spiked with 
democratization in 1986, it has remained comparatively low, and has dropped very recently. 
Botswana had extremely low PI under British colonial rule, but experienced a dramatic increase 
with de-colonization in 1966. Botswana’s high PI score has persisted thereafter, under multi-party 
elections and a Botswana Democratic Party government. Bulgaria experienced increasing, and 
very high, PI with Communist rule after WWII. PI then declined with the fall of one-party rule 
and introduction of multi-party politics. 
 
																																								 																				
5 We should thus expect a link between an indicator and welfare state outcomes even when controlling for the other 
indicators. 
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Figure 1: Average score on PI, over time, in eight world regions 
 
Figure 2: PI score over time in four selected countries  
 
Measures of welfare state features  
We have argued that party institutionalization should foster national, extensive, generous, and 
universal social policies, and, by implication, correlate negatively with local, targeted, or 
particularistic policies. No measure exists that properly captures all these dimensions together, 
except for over shorter periods of time (Scruggs, 2006). Instead, we employ several measures, 
compiled from various sources, to test the different implications separately.  
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Our first measure is from the recent Social Policies around the World Dataset (SPAW), 
and captures how encompassing welfare states are in terms of risks covered. 
“Encompassingness” counts whether a major, national welfare law exists for each risk covered by 
SPAW, namely old-age, unemployment, maternity leave, child birth (family allowances), work-
injury, and sickness. The operational criterion for a major program is that at least one of the 
following social groups are covered: agricultural workers; industrial/production workers; small-
firm workers; self-employed; students; employers; temporary/casual workers; family/domestic 
workers (for closer discussion, see Knutsen and Rasmussen forthcoming). Encompassingness 
thus ranges from 0 (no major program in any area) to 6 (major program in all areas). For the 9053 
observations in Model 1, Table 1, the mean score is 3.4 and the median is 4 programs. Figure 3 
shows the distribution on Encompassingness, sorted by quartile on our measure of party 
institutionalization, showing that number of major welfare programs is typically higher in 
observations with high scores on PI. 
 
Figure 3: Histograms on Encompassingness for 9053 observations in Model 1, Table 1, by 
PI quartile. 
In order to capture the extent to which welfare benefits are universal we use the v2dlunivl 
indicator from V-Dem, which purports to measure “[h]ow many welfare programs are means-
tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?” Beneficial for isolating 
the universalism dimension of welfare states, V-Dem expert coders are explicitly told not to score 
whether a welfare state is present or not, but instead the structure of what benefits exists. This 
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means that v2dlunivl should not tap welfare state size per se.6 For the 16267 observations in Model 
4, Table 1, the mean, median and standard deviations are, respectively, -0.17, 0.02 and 1.47. The 
lowest score is -3.26 and the highest is 3.23. Figure 4 displays histograms for these observations, 
sorting the sample by quartiles on PI, and Figure 5 plots PI against v2dlunivl for two selected 
years. In general, countries have higher universalism scores when party institutionalization is high. 
 
Figure 4: Histograms on v2dlunivl for 16267 observations in Model 4, Table 1, by PI 
quartile. 
																																								 																				
6 We test the sensitivity of our findings to this assumption by controlling for number of major welfare policies 
enacted (Table A8). 
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Figure 5: Scatter plots of PI and v2dlunivl in 1950 (left) and 2000 (right). 
The encompassing risk coverage measure from SPAW and universalism measure from V-
Dem are our two primary measures. Both allow us to include information from more than 150 
countries and time series longer than 100 years. Yet, given concerns about PI and v2dlunivl both 
being drawn from V-Dem and potential resulting biases, which we discuss more closely below, 
we test two additional measures of universalism:  
The first is the Universalism Index (UI) from SPAW, which also has extensive coverage. 
UI counts the number of social groups, as listed above, for each of the six major risk/policy areas 
in SPAW, and then aggregates over these areas. More specifically, 0 is given for a policy area if 
there is no major program; 1 if a program is means-tested based on some property criteria 
(income-based exclusions are not considered means-tested); 2 if one social group is covered by a 
contribution- or employment-based program; 3 if two groups are covered, etc. Finally, if the 
program automatically includes all citizens, 9 is given. Since there are six policy areas, and the 
programs are aggregated by addition, UI ranges from 0–54. The second, from the SCIP-database 
(Korpi & Palme, 2007), measures share of the work-force insured against illness in a state 
program.7  These data allow us to include only 21 countries (mostly the “old” OECD members), 
measured from 1930 to 2000.  
																																								 																				
7  We also test other proxies of welfare state universalism, such as V-Dem’s “v2dlencmps” measure capturing 
segmentation, or the targeting of goods to particular groups. 
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Unfortunately, data coverage is far more restricted for welfare program generosity, 
existing only for more recent decades and mainly developed OECD democracies. Replacement 
rates measure the ratio of an average worker’s wage that would be replaced by the benefit, and is 
the most commonly used welfare state generosity measure (see Scruggs 2006). The CEWD 
(Scruggs 2006) and SCIP (Korpi & Palme, 2007) datasets both provide replacement rate data. 
While CEWD reports data on a yearly basis from 1971 to 2012 for 22 countries, SCIP reports 
data for the 1930s, but at five-year intervals from 1950, for 20 countries. SCIP thus allows us to 
capture important pre-World War II developments, but we lose year-to-year variation. In the 
appendix, we display results using both datasets, but in the paper, we only focus on the SCIP data 
reflecting that we prioritize including historical variation. We also probe models using Social 
expenditure/GDP from Armingeon et al. (2017) as a (very) rough proxy of overall welfare state 
generosity.   
 
Control Variables and Benchmark Model 
Our benchmark model is an OLS estimator with panel corrected standard errors to account for 
panel-specific heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We always include country- and year-fixed 
effects. The country-fixed effects allow controlling for factors that are hard to observe and fairly 
stable within countries (national party culture, ethnic composition, specific colonial history, 
geographical features such as natural harbors that induce trade, etc) and that may simultaneously 
determine both party institutionalization and social policy. Including country-fixed effects is 
made feasible by the long time series and the substantial within-country variation in PI; the 
within-country standard deviation is 0.18, not far from the 0.26 between-country standard 
deviation. The year-fixed effects allow us to account for any global time trends in party and 
welfare state development and common “shocks”, such as ILO-conventions, global economic 
depressions, and world wars.  
One complicating feature is the (presumably) complex causal relationships between PI 
and other observable factors that may affect welfare state development. Take income level, where 
one can plausibly argue that wealthier countries have advantages in allowing for more 
institutionalized parties (e.g., Kitschelt & Kselman, 2013) and better opportunities to finance 
encompassing welfare schemes. This suggests that we should control for income. Yet, extant 
work also finds that party institutionalization enhances economic development (e.g., Bernhard et 
al. 2016). This suggests that including income could induce post-treatment bias by controlling for 
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an indirect effect. Likewise, political regime type and electoral system could also be post-
treatment to political party features (see, e.g., Kitschelt and Kselman 2013).  
Resolving this issue and identifying the single “true” model is difficult, if not impossible. 
We thus rely on a strategy of testing both parsimonious models, which privileges mitigating post-
treatment bias over omitted variable bias, and more extensive models, which privilege mitigating 
omitted variable bias. The most parsimonious models only include country- and year dummies 
alongside PI as regressors. Our baseline extensive specification includes four controls, which we 
think there is strong theoretical rationale for considering as confounders (descriptive statistics are 
in Table A.2). These are regime type/democracy, measured by V-Dem’s Polyarchy index (Teorell 
et al. 2016); electoral system (PR and mixed system dummies, with plural-majoritarian as 
reference category) from V-Dem; income level, measured as ln GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted), 
from the Maddison Project (Bolt & Zanden, 2014); and, ln population from Miller (2015). 
Our results are not reliant on using these two a priori preferred specifications, and we 
report additional models, e.g. controlling for the lagged dependent variable (LDV) to further 
guard against unobserved confounders. We also highlight that we use military and public order 
spending as outcomes in placebo-tests to mitigate concerns that party institutionalization simply 
correlates with all forms of state expansion.  Further, we test models controlling for features such 
as urbanization, trade openness, income inequality, land inequality, union density, left-wing 
governments, interstate wars, civil wars, political corruption, civil society strength, female political 
participation, and features of the state administration, and we leverage generalized sensitivity 
analysis to assess how great omitted variable bias from other unobserved confounders must be 
for our results to be spurious.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
We first present results from our core specifications. While we place focus on results using the 
composite PI and our two main measures of welfare state encompassingness and universalism, 
we also present results for our alternative dependent variables and for indicators tapping 
different, specific aspects of party institutionalization. Next, we present and discuss robustness 
tests. Finally, we discuss nuances and extensions, testing for how the relationship travels across 
different contexts. 
 
	
	
21 
Main results 
We start by employing Encompassingness from SPAW as dependent variable. Results are 
presented in the four leftmost columns of Table 1. Model 1 is the parsimonious specification 
only including country- and year-fixed effects alongside PI. Drawing on 9053 observations from 
134 countries, it suggests a clear, positive relationship (t=8.8). The point estimate suggests that a 
one-unit increase on PI increases the expected number of major welfare programs at the national 
level by 0.59 – about one sixth of the sample-mean number of programs (3.37). 
The result from Model 1 is only moderately attenuated when controlling for differences 
in electoral system, regime type, income and population in Model 2. While Model 2 suggests that 
also high levels of GDP per capita, larger populations, proportional representation, and – 
perhaps more surprisingly (but see, Haggard & Kaufman 2008; Knutsen & Rasmussen 
forthcoming) – low levels of democracy systematically relate to welfare state encompassingness, 
PI only drops from 0.59 to 0.42 and remains highly significant (t=5.9). 
Despite the inclusion of the fixed effects alongside the theoretically motivated controls, 
one might worry that other (time-variant) confounders or co-integrated trends could generate a 
spurious link between PI and Encompassingness. Yet, different specifications that we tested and 
that should purge such potential confounding, including Model 3 which uses changes in 
Encompassingness from the previous year as dependent variable and includes a lagged dependent 
variable as regressor, suggest that this is not so. Even in this conservative model, PI has a t-value 
of 2.6. 
Models 4-6 replicate Models 1-3, but using v2dlunivl as dependent variable. As anticipated 
by our argument, PI is a clear and strong predictor, and t-values range from 30.7 (Model 4) to 7.7 
(Models 6).8 Hence, the more institutionalized political parties are, the more policies are oriented 
towards broad groups and the provision of public goods. In Model 4, the estimated effect of 
going from minimum (0) to maximum (1) on PI is a 1.31-point increase in v2dlunivl. This is only 
slightly lower than the sample’s standard deviation on v2dlunivl (1.47) or the difference in 2010-
scores between (more universal) Norway or Denmark and the (less universal) United States 
(1.45). 
 
																																								 																				
8 The number of observations range from 16267 in the model excluding covariates to 7124 observations. The main 
reason for why the parsimonious model includes so many observations relate to V-Dem also coding the political 
experiences of colonies. In the extensive models, colonies are excluded due to missing data on covariates. 
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Table 1: Party institutionalization and welfare state encompassingness, universality, generosity and size: main models  
Data source SPAW V-Dem SPAW SCIP Armingeon 
Dep. var. Encompassingness Universalism Universalism RR Coverage Social exp. 
Level/Change L L C L L C L L L L 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) ( 9) (10) 
Party Institut. 0.59*** 0.42*** 0.090** 1.31*** 1.30*** 0.21*** 1.90*** 1.63*** 1.27*** 3.68 
 (8.80) (5.85) (2.63) (30.73) (16.23) (7.73) (4.81) (8.03) (5.40) (1.79) 
PR   0.55*** 0.073***  0.10** 0.042*** 0.63** 0.071 -0.11* -1.28* 
  (16.22) (4.28)  (2.65) (3.38) (3.17) (1.26) (-2.32) (-2.17) 
Mixed el. sys.  0.52*** 0.042*  -0.14*** -0.0064 2.13*** 0.12 -0.025 -1.69** 
  (11.37) (2.10)  (-3.80) (-0.48) (7.22) (1.95) (-0.42) (-3.26) 
Polyarchy  -0.44*** -0.020  0.35*** -0.0029 0.70 -0.54*** -0.30* 1.60 
  (-6.30) (-0.64)  (5.42) (-0.12) (1.69) (-3.86) (-2.10) (1.36) 
Pop. (ln)  1.17*** 0.23***  0.10* -0.014 0.81* -0.19* -0.041 -4.42*** 
  (26.99) (9.73)  (2.53) (-1.05) (2.56) (-2.31) (-0.38) (-5.39) 
GDP p.c. (ln)   0.18*** 0.060***  0.28*** 0.0062 0.40 0.018 0.25*** 0.87 
  (4.98) (3.61)  (9.74) (0.60) (1.76) (0.37) (4.94) (1.06) 
Dep. Var.t-1   -0.17***   -0.083***     
   (-17.60)   (-13.89)     
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9053 6154 6109 16267 7137 7124 4172 263 267 781 
Countries 134 121 121 169 142 142 113 20 21 22 
Time period  1900-2013 1900-2004 1900-2004 1900-2015 1900-2004 1901-2004 1900-2004 1930-2000 1930-2000 1960-2004 
*p<0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p<0.001. OLS with panel corrected standard errors. T-values reported in parentheses. Constant, year dummies and country dummies not displayed. 
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Yet, one issue cautions us against readily interpreting the results from Models 4-6 as PI having a 
systematic, real-world effect on universalism. This relates to the potential for coder-induced bias; results 
may be upward-biased since some of the same V-Dem coders are rating multiple V-Dem surveys and 
thus scoring countries both on the indicators included in PI and on universalism. Further, such coder 
biases, if present, should affect also V-Dem’s electoral democracy measure (Polyarchy). Controlling for 
Polyarchy should therefore help purge the PI–Universalism relationship of such a bias. Encouragingly, 
results are very similar when including and excluding Polyarchy. Further, the PI–universalism result 
persisting also for universalism measures taken from other sources:  
Model 7 displays the extensive specification similar to in Model 5, but using UI from SPAW. 
The measure counts the number of social groups covered by a social policy program in a particular 
area, and aggregates up over six social policy areas. While UI has its own limitations, notably that it 
does not capture and weight the size of the social groups, any relationship with PI should be unaffected 
by the type of coder bias discussed above. PI remains highly significant in Model 7 (t=4.8), suggesting 
that institutionalized parties correspond with social policy programs covering more social groups, 
although we note that the link with PI is not as robust to changing the model specification for UI as for 
our other welfare measures (see, e.g., Appendix Tables A5 and A16). 
The next models use measures from SCIP, namely Replacement Rates (Model 8) and Coverage 
(Model 9) for sickness, capturing, respectively, welfare state generosity and universalism. Only about 20 
countries, mostly Western OECD democracies, with times series extending back to 1930 are included. 
This makes identifying any relationship with PI a very demanding exercise, even if a relationship should 
exist. (We remind that we control for both country- and year-fixed effects, plus the four standard 
covariates). Despite this, PI displays a positive and highly significant relationship with both replacement 
rates (t=8.0) and coverage (t=5.4). The small samples used in Models 8 and 9 might raise concerns that 
results are shaped by outliers. Further tests (removing extreme observations according to different 
criteria) suggest that this is not so, as also illustrated by the partial regression plots in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Partial regression plots of estimates from Models 8 (left, DV=Sickness benefits 
replacement rate) and 9 (right, DV=Sickness benefits coverage), Table 1. 
 
In Model 10, we show results for social transfer expenditure from ILO, a rough proxy of 
welfare state generosity. PI is now only weakly significant (t=1.8). Yet, the estimated coefficient is very 
large – suggesting that going from 0 to 1 on PI increases social expenditure as share of GDP by about 
3.7 percentage points – and Model 10 only includes data from 22 countries and time series covering 
1960–2004.9 
In sum, our core specifications suggest that party institutionalization positively affects the three 
relevant features of a country’s welfare state, namely encompassingness, universalism and generosity. 
We now turn to disaggregating PI and investigating which particular aspects of party 
institutionalization are the most strongly related to welfare state development. Gauging results based on 
the individual indicators included in PI also helps inform us about which of the discussed mechanisms 
operate more strongly, as the indicators relate to different, theoretically relevant sub-components of 
party institutionalization. 
																																								 																				
9  As already noted, the confounders may be affected by PI, and thus give post-treatment when included. Hence, in 
Appendix A4 we remove the four confounders and re-estimate the models (we keep the two-way fixed effects). For sickness 
coverage and replacement rates, respectively, the estimated coefficients drop to 0.93 (t= 7.41) and 0.96 (t= 9.12), while for 
spending the coefficient increases in size and turns significant (5.95, t= 4.62).  
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The regressions presented in Table 2 employ the V-Dem universalism indicator (v2dlunivl) as 
dependent variable, but similar specifications on the alternative dependent variables are in Appendix 
A5. For v2dlunivl four of the five components included in PI bear a strong and consistent relationship.  
Model 6 in Table 2 shows that this holds also when controlling for all five indicators 
simultaneously, suggesting that different mechanisms linking party institutionalization to welfare state 
development operate at the same time, in accordance with our comprehensive argument (and the 
choice of additive aggregation for PI, allowing for partial substitutability between indicators).  
 
Table 2 Disaggregating party institutionalization and estimating effects on welfare state 
universalism (v2dlunivl) 
Dependent variable: V-Dem Universalism 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party organizations 0.27***     0.21*** 
 (17.40)     (10.87) 
Local branches  0.24***    0.071*** 
  (13.86)    (3.40) 
Party linkages   0.33***   0.29*** 
   (21.78)   (18.57) 
Distinct platforms    0.065***  -0.16*** 
    (3.99)  (-9.63) 
Legislative cohesion     0.21*** 0.14*** 
     (13.87) (9.89) 
Population (logged) 0.17*** 0.12** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 
 (4.20) (2.99) (3.70) (4.23) (4.94) (3.89) 
GDP per capita (logged)  0.29*** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.20*** 
 (10.22) (8.92) (7.78) (9.94) (8.87) (7.09) 
Polyarchy 0.38*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.75*** 1.05*** 0.49*** 
 (5.94) (7.70) (7.70) (10.84) (15.68) (7.63) 
PR 0.12** 0.12** 0.051 0.11** 0.17*** 0.12*** 
 (3.17) (3.17) (1.35) (2.81) (4.56) (3.34) 
Mixed -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.12*** 
 (-3.41) (-3.60) (-4.12) (-3.62) (-3.71) (-3.56) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7137 7137 7125 7125 7093 7093 
Countries 142 142 142 142 142 121 
Time period 1900-2004 1900-2004 1900-2004 1900-2004 1900-2004 1900-2004 
*p<0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p<0.001. OLS with panel corrected standard errors. T-values reported in parentheses. 
 
In Table 2, “Party linkages” displays the strongest relationship, closely followed by permanent 
organizations, local branches and voting cohesion. We note that presence of local branches and types 
of linkages were key to the bottom-up mechanisms posited in our theoretical argument, allowing 
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institutionalized parties to widen their circle of constituents and elicit information from various groups. 
Nonetheless, also two features that are central to the proposed top-down mechanisms are relatively 
strong and robust. Stable national organizations are vital for bargaining and overcoming various veto 
players, whereas legislative party cohesion is a direct signal of parties’ ability to discipline and 
coordinate members.  
Distinct party platforms, which presumably captures a clearly expressed ideology and policy-
based competition between parties, has the opposite effect of what we expected in Model 6, which 
controls simultaneously for all five indicators. This could be an indication that mere policy-based 
competition between parties is not the deciding factor for introducing universal benefits. This points to 
the findings (discussed further below) that party institutionalization has a clear and strong effect on 
welfare state universalism not only in democracies, but also in autocracies. What seems to matter 
instead for welfare state universalism are parties’ ability to ensure coordination (between salient social 
groups and politicians) and overcome veto players when implementing policies (our top-down 
mechanisms), as well as the linkages that parties form with mass constituencies and the ability to 
capture demands coming from broad social groups (our bottom-up mechanisms).10  
 
Robustness tests 
We tested an extensive battery of specifications to assess sensitivity. Briefly summarized, the core 
finding (on PI) is very robust. Most tests are presented in the Appendix, but we report and discuss a 
selection of important, and quite different, tests in this section, focusing on welfare state universalism. 
Table 3 presents these tests for the v2dlunivl.  
Model 1, Table 3 replicates our extensive benchmark model (Model 6, Table 1). The first 
robustness test, Model 2, alters the lag specification, lagging all independent variables by five years. PI is 
somewhat attenuated, dropping from 1.3 to 0.8, but remains sizeable and highly significant (t=9.9). In 
Model 3, we further extend the lag to 10 years, and PI remains robust (t=4.6) although the estimated 
coefficient drops further to 0.3. These results suggest, first, that PI may have both fairly proximal and 
distal effects on welfare state development. Second, our core result is less likely to (only) reflect a 
																																								 																				
10 We note that patterns are less consistent across welfare measures for the indicators-specific tests than for the combined 
index. For example, Party Organization and Party Linkages are robust for generosity (as measured by Replacement Rates; 
Table A11), whereas Distinct Platforms and Local Branches are robust for Encompassingness (Table A9). 
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reverse causality bias, as measuring the independent variable 10 years before the dependent should help 
mitigate X-Y circularity.  
Despite the plausible controls in the benchmark, one might still worry that the reported 
relationship is inflated by omitted variable bias. We thus tested specifications with additional controls 
(although this typically reduces sample size and could introduce post-treatment bias). Models 4-6 are 
three such specifications: Model 4 includes extra socio-economic covariates that may affect 
universalism and correlate with PI, namely urbanization, trade openness, income inequality, and land 
inequality (see Appendix Table A1 for operationalization and data sources). Model 5 includes two 
pertinent controls for working class organization, namely union density and left-wing government. 
Model 6 adds controls pertaining to national-level political institutions and civil society that may 
determine party institutionalization and welfare policies, namely interstate war, civil war, political 
corruption, impartiality of the state administration, civil society strength and participation in politics, 
and female political participation.  
These tests are important as they account for other very plausible explanations of welfare state 
universalism – such as working class power, civil society strength, or female political mobilization 
allowing particular social groups to expand the welfare state (e.g., Huber & Stephens, 2001), or that 
having high-quality state institutions eases the implementation of comprehensive welfare programs 
(e.g., Rothstein et al., 2012). Several of these theoretically relevant controls are, indeed, highly 
significant in the expected direction. Yet, our main result is stable. The benchmark PI coefficient is 1.3, 
whereas PI ranges between 1.3 and 1.6 in Models 4-6, and t-value ranges from 7.4 to 16.3. Results 
remain stable when we include different combinations of controls or enter any of them separately in 
the benchmark. 
We tested various ways of aggregating the indicators (or subsets of indicators) of PI – with one 
example being the extracted first component from a factor analysis (Model 7) – and our main result is 
robust. A specific worry is that the strong correlation between party institutionalization and 
universalism could come from coders considering whether parties adopt broad, national welfare 
programs and let this influence the coding of parties as programmatic rather than clientelist. Thus, we 
add the linkages indicator as a separate control in Model 8, thereby purging the PI coefficient for the 
influence of this indicator. While PI is attenuated, both PI and linkages are sizeable and significant at 1 
percent. Our main result is also robust to dropping the linkages measure before reconstructing PI from 
the remaining indicators (Appendix A8).   
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Further, we tested alternative estimators. Model 9, a random effects model, allows us to capture 
also within-country variation. PI remains comparable in size to the baseline model, although the 
standard error increases quite a lot. Nonetheless, PI remains significant at 1 percent. In Model 10 we 
employ the ordinalized version of v2dlunivl and re-estimate our benchmark specification using ordinal 
logistic regression. PI remains robust.  
Table 3: Robustness tests on welfare state universalism (v2dlunivl) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS RE RE 
Ologit 
 Baseline 
5 year 
lag 
10 year 
lag 
Socio- 
econ. 
controls 
Work. 
class 
controls 
Instit. and 
civil society 
controls 
First 
component  
PI 
Control 
linkages 
Random 
effects 
model 
Ordinal 
logistic  
Party Instit. 1.30*** 0.75*** 0.34*** 1.26*** 1.64*** 1.26*** 0.33*** 0.75*** 1.29** 3.47* 
 (16.23) (9.89) (4.64) (11.32) (7.44) (16.33) (20.85) (8.91) (2.65) (2.25) 
Polyarchy 0.35*** 0.70*** 0.85*** 0.59*** 1.65*** -0.37*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.34 1.89 
 (5.42) (10.67) (12.56) (8.13) (11.11) (-3.80) (3.53) (4.35) (0.99) (1.46) 
Pop. (ln) 0.10* 0.14** 0.20*** 0.62*** -0.61*** 0.28*** 0.14*** 0.11** 0.014 -0.25 
 (2.53) (3.09) (4.24) (9.51) (-6.50) (6.82) (3.51) (2.75) (0.10) (-0.43) 
GDP pc (ln)  0.28*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.42*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.25* 1.06** 
 (9.74) (7.90) (7.86) (12.38) (3.31) (7.99) (7.66) (7.93) (1.98) (2.61) 
PR 0.10** 0.10* 0.080 -0.21*** 0.58*** 0.13*** 0.094* 0.044 0.10 0.40 
 (2.65) (2.50) (1.88) (-4.24) (9.53) (3.61) (2.55) (1.17) (0.61) (0.74) 
Mixed -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.26*** 0.48*** -0.068 -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.14 -0.51 
 (-3.80) (-3.61) (-4.21) (-5.95) (5.24) (-1.83) (-4.26) (-4.33) (-0.80) (-0.88) 
Urbaniz.    1.1e-10       
    (0.19)       
Openness    0.0017       
    (0.92)       
Income ineq.     -0.0044**       
    (-3.04)       
Fam. farms    0.0065***       
    (5.48)       
Union dens.     0.0077***      
     (7.16)      
Left     0.15***      
     (4.83)      
Inter-st. war      -0.052     
      (-1.47)     
Civil war      -0.19***     
      (-5.65)     
Corruption      -1.22***     
      (-12.03)     
Imp. Admin.      0.13***     
      (8.89)     
Civil society      -0.50 
(-0.57) 
    
Female parti.      1.87***     
      (24.97)     
Party link.        0.27***   
        (16.26)   
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7137 6975 6732 4208 1635 6116 7093 7125 7137 7137 
Countries 142 142 142 129 31 130 142 142 142 142 
Time Period 1900-
2004  
1905-
2004 
1910-
2004 
1935- 
2004 
1900-
2004 
1900- 
2004 
1900- 
2004  
1900-
2004  
1900-
2004  
1900-
2004  
*p<0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p<0.001. OLS with panel corrected standard errors. T-values reported in parentheses. 
	
	
29 
We undertook two placebo-tests, using military spending and public-order spending as 
dependent variables (Appendix A9). We argued that party institutionalization is key to welfare state 
development because it incentivizes and enables parties to carry out national, universal legislative 
proposals even when particularistic elite interests oppose these initiatives. We surmise that military and 
public-order spending do not face similar hostile vested (elite) interests, and we otherwise fail to see 
how our argument should pertain clearly to such spending. Consequently, we should not observe a clear 
relationship between PI and these measures. Instead, a significant relationship might indicate that PI 
correlates with all forms of state expansion, and that the relationship of interest is driven by some 
unmeasured confounder (although we remind that we control for state capacity measures above). 
Nonetheless, while PI is positively correlated with military spending, it is far from statistically significant 
(t-value 0.39). For public order spending the relationship is negative and insignificant (t-value -0.63). 
To further assess the likelihood that omitted confounders are driving our results, we test how 
serious such bias would have to be to reduce the PI coefficient by half, using generalized sensitivity 
analysis (GSA). This analysis suggests that any omitted factor would have to correlate much higher with 
our welfare measures and PI than any of the theoretically plausible controls that we have identified and 
included in our regressions. This increases our confidence that omitted variable bias is not driving the 
observed correlation.  
 
Assessing heterogeneity 
We turn now to testing whether our estimates mask heterogeneous effects across contexts. We 
investigate this by splitting our samples on theoretically interesting factors, which provides a simple and 
transparent way of investigating effect heterogeneity (Appendix A10 reports interaction models). In 
general, we find systematic links between party institutionalization and the different welfare state 
features in various contexts. Again, we mainly focus on results for v2dlunivl, and display other 
dependent variables in Appendix A7. 
First, we investigate whether the effect of party institutionalization is restricted to democratic 
contexts. We noted that the bottom-up mechanisms of our argument might not work as strongly in 
autocracies as in democracies, although the top-down mechanisms suggest that institutionalized parties 
should enhance, e.g., universalism in both democracies and autocracies. Splitting the sample according 
to the dichotomous Boix, Miller & Rosato (2013) democracy measure (BMR), we find that PI is about 
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three times larger in democracies (Model 2, Table 4) than in autocracies (Model 1). Nonetheless, PI is 
substantially large and highly significant (t=7.8 in Model 1) also in the sub-sample for autocracies. This 
difference across regimes is persistent, but typically smaller, in other specifications that we tested; 
Figure 7 presents point estimates from an interaction specification (resembling Models 1 and 2, but 
adding PI*BMR) run on the full sample. PI is a significant predictor in both regime contexts, but the 
estimated effect is about twice as large in BMR democracies. Hence, institutionalized parties foster 
more universal social policies in both autocracies and in democracies, though they seem even more 
important in the latter context.11 
 
Table 4 Split sample tests on party institutionalization and welfare state universalism 
(v2dlunivl) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample: Autocratic Democratic Western 
countries 
Non-western 
countries 
Low rural 
inequality 
High rural 
inequality 
Party Institut. 0.73*** 2.42*** 2.30*** 0.98*** 1.21*** 0.94*** 
 (7.77) (16.19) (13.13) (11.94) (13.25) (7.17) 
Population (ln) -0.26** -0.012 -0.35*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.17 
 (-2.97) (-0.27) (-3.96) (7.90) (9.04) (1.54) 
GDP p.c. (ln) 0.19*** 0.54*** 0.60*** 0.23*** 0.47*** 0.23** 
 (5.05) (15.77) (7.45) (7.57) (15.85) (2.99) 
PR -0.030 0.078 0.52*** -0.10* 0.038 0.15** 
 (-0.65) (1.75) (9.44) (-2.45) (1.01) (2.58) 
Mixed -0.22*** 0.12* 0.48*** -0.22*** -0.20*** 0.13 
 (-4.62) (1.98) (4.83) (-5.40) (-4.39) (1.96) 
Polyarchy   1.00*** -0.069 -0.026 0.65*** 
   (8.46) (-0.97) (-0.37) (5.56) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3981 3137 1718 5419 4167 2885 
Countries 115  98  20  122  124 93 
Time period 1900-2004 1900-2004 1900-2004 1900-2004 1900-2004 1900-2004 
*p<0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p<0.001. OLS with panel corrected standard errors. T-values reported in parentheses. The Regime 
samples are determined by their scoring on Boix et al (2013) binary measure of democracy. For high and low inequality 
samples we use median sample-score (33) on percentage share of farm land that is family farms (from Vanhanen 2000; low 
score suggesting high rural inequality) as cutoff.  
 
																																								 																				
11  For Encompassingness, the estimated split-sample coefficient is positive but close to zero for autocracies, but 
substantially large and significant for democracies. For additional split-sample and interaction tests, see Appendices A7 and 
A10. 
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Figure 7. Estimated effect on v2dlunivl of increasing PI from 0 to 1 in autocracies and 
democracies, with 95 confidence intervals. The specification resembles Models 1 and 2, Table 
4, but is run on full sample and includes interaction term. 
	
Second, we wanted to test whether our results are mainly driven by the experiences of Western 
countries. If so, the support for our (general) argument would be weakened, or at the very least this 
would suggest some (un-theorized) historical or cultural pre-requisites for our mechanisms to work. 
While we do find that the estimated PI is larger in Western (Model 3; 2.3) than other (Model 4; 1.0) 
countries, PI is substantial in size and highly significant in both samples. Appendix A10 for example 
contains analysis removing specific regions from the sample in seriatim, and the relationship is 
surprisingly robust across geographical contexts. 
Third, we checked whether the effect is strongly contingent on the socio-economic context. 
One might, for example, hypothesize that strong, mass-based parties help ensure the formulation and 
effective implementation of universal welfare programs only where there is low economic inequality, 
and thus smaller redistributive burdens on elites (see Boix 2003). Alternatively, institutionalized parties 
could display a stronger relationship with universalism in high-inequality settings, as institutionalized 
parties would be a requisite to overcome powerful elite groups, such as rural landlords, in these 
contexts. Yet, when using Vanhanen’s share of family farms as proxy for land inequality, and splitting 
the sample at the median, PI is systematically linked to universalism in both low- and high-inequality 
settings – the coefficient is only moderately higher in low-inequality settings. Results are basically 
similar if we split the sample using Gini coefficients on income inequality (see Table A33). Neither is 
the effect of party institutionalization restricted to developing or developed countries. When splitting 
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the sample by median GDP per capita, PI relates quite similarly (and significantly) to v2dlunivl in both 
contexts. Additional tests show fairly consistent relationships also across countries that are less or more 
corrupt or that have less or more impartial public administration, suggesting that having strong state 
institutional capacity is not a pre-requisite for institutionalized parties to influence welfare state 
development (c.f. Shefter, 1977). 
Finally, we investigated whether the relationship is non-linear by employing a Kernel 
Regularized Least Squares (KRLS) method, computing marginal effects for each observation 
(Hainmueller & Hazlett, 2014). Notably, the marginal effects are consistently positive and highly 
significant for all our dependent variables (except for social transfer spending/GDP, the only non-
significant predictor from Table 1), and suggest close to linear relationships. Thus, increased PI seems 
to go together with more encompassing, universal and generous welfare states, no matter if we start out 
at relatively low or high levels of party institutionalization 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have argued that highly institutionalized parties have both the incentives and the capacity to enact 
more universal and generous social policy programs covering against various risks. We identify to type 
of mechanisms that contribute to this relationship, namely “bottom-up” and “top-down” mechanisms. 
The former refers to the ability of parties to widen their circle of constituents and elicit information 
about their demands, whereas the latter refers to the ability of parties to overcome veto players inside 
and outside their organization and effectively implement policies. Both types of mechanisms are 
theorized to pull in the same direction, implying that highly institutionalized parties should make for 
more encompassing, universal, and generous welfare states. These expectations find very robust 
support in our empirical analysis, even when accounting for country-specific and time-specific factors 
or measured differences in institutional features such as regime type, electoral system, civil society 
organization, or state capacity. Our extensive samples, going well beyond the “typical” set of developed 
post-war OECD democracies used in many extant studies of political parties or welfare states, allow us 
to assess whether or not our (purportedly general) theoretical argument finds support in various spatial, 
temporal, socio-economic and political regime contexts – as it generally turns out to do.  
Our argument and empirical results speak to hitherto distinct literatures: First, we contribute to 
the welfare state literature. Previous explanations of the origins of the universal welfare state have often 
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focused on specific actors or the power-balance between actors, typically highlighting working class 
organization or social democratic parties (e.g., Huber & Stephens 2001), democratization and 
bureaucratization (Orloff & Skocpol, 1984), or a combination of impartial and effective state 
institutions and working class mobilization (e.g., Rothstein et al., 2012). Our analysis does find that 
working-class organization and state structures matter for welfare development, but neither factor 
cancels out the result that party institutionalization strongly relates to welfare development.  
Second, we contribute to work on political parties and their effects. A vast literature has detailed 
how features of parties in democratic systems, and party institutionalization in particular, shape various 
outcomes, including democratic stability and public goods provision (e.g., Hicken et al., 2015). 
Likewise, a rapidly growing literature on parties in autocracies has detailed how institutionalized parties 
– and regime parties in particular – affect different outcomes such as regime stability, prospects for 
democratization, and investment (e.g., Gehlbach & Keefer, 2011; Magaloni, 2006; Svolik, 2012; Wright, 
2008). We add to (and bridge) these literatures by showing how party institutionalization matters also 
for different welfare state features, and by theorizing and showing that the effects of party 
institutionalization manifest themselves in both democratic and autocratic settings.  
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Appendices 
Overview 
The appendices in this document contain the following material: Appendix A1 includes descriptions of 
the variables used for the analysis, and lists the sources from which they are drawn. A2 displays 
descriptive statistics for the observations included in different core models in Table 1 of the paper. A3 
lists the country-year observations included in Model, Table 1. 
 
The subsequent appendices contain additional robustness tests and extensions that are not reported in 
tables or figures in the paper. A4 displays our core specifications on alternative dependent variables, as 
well as specifications using different control variable sets. A5 replicates the indicator-specific tests from 
Table 2, disaggregating the components of the Party Institutionalization index, for other dependent 
variables than the V-Dem universalism indicator. A6 replicates the core robustness tests from Table 3 
for the alternative dependent variables, and shows additional tests adding controls to our benchmark 
model. A7 replicates the split-sample tests from Table 4 for the other dependent variables. A8 displays 
the core regression specifications, but using an alternative version of our main independent variable 
(PI). A9 shows Placebo tests on outcomes we did not theoretically expect should be affected by PI. 
Finally, A10 includes a host of additional split-sample and interaction tests, further assessing the 
potential heterogeneity of the relationships between party institutionalization, on the one hand, and the 
different welfare state features, on the other. 
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Appendix A1: Measures 
 
Table A1. Variable definitions and sources for variables reported in the paper 
Variable: Defintion Source 
Party organizations 
(v2psorgs)   
How many political parties for national-level office have permanent 
organizations?  A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of 
personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the 
election season. Responses:  (0) No parties.  (1) Fewer than half of the parties.  
(2) About half of the parties.  (3) More than half of the parties.  (4) All parties.   
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Party branches 
(v2psprbrch)   
How many parties have permanent local party branches? Responses:  (0) None.  
(1) Fewer than half.  (2) About half.  (3) More than half.  (4) All. 
 
   
Party linkages 
(v2psprlnks) 
Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to 
their constituents? A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of “good” that 
the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party 
activities. Responses:  (0) Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, 
cash, and/or jobs.  (1) Mixed clientelistic and local collective.  (2) Local 
collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, e.g., wells, 
toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development.  (3) Mixed local 
collective and policy/programmatic.  (4) Policy/programmatic.  Constituents 
respond to a party’s positions on national policies, general party programs, and 
visions for society. 
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Distinct platforms 
(v2psplats) 
How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or 
presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are 
publicized and relatively distinct from one another? In order to be counted in 
the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both distinct (either in 
terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly disseminated. This 
question is not intended to measure how much the public actually knows about 
these platforms or whether they are important in structuring policymaking. 
Responses: (0) None, or nearly none. (1) Fewer than half. (2) About half. (3) 
More than half. (4) All, or nearly all. 
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Legislative cohesion 
(v2pscohesv)   
Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their 
party on important bills?  Responses:  (0) Not really. Many members are elected 
as independents and party discipline is very weak.  (1) More often than not. 
Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but 
defections are common.  (2) Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of 
the time. (3) Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the 
time. 
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Party 
institutionalization 
index 
To what extent are political parties institutionalized. PI is aggregated by 
summing across standardized versions of v2psorgs, v2psprbrch, v2psprlnks, 
v2psplats and v2pscohesv. This sum is then normalized to 0–1 by using the 
cumulative density function.See main text for details. 
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Encompassingness The number of major national welfare programs, within six risk areas, that are 
enacted. For a program to count as “major”, at least one out of a pre-defined 
set of relatively broad social groups needs to be covered. The relevant groups 
are the following: agricultural workers; industrial/production workers; small-
firm workers; self-employed; students; employers; temporary/casual workers; 
family/domestic workers. See main text for details. 
SPAW, 
Rasmussen 
(2017) 
   
Universalism 
(v2dlunivl) 
How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or 
virtually all) members of the polity? A means-tested program targets poor, 
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
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needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are 
normally means-tested. A universal (non-means tested) program potentially 
benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, 
and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from 
these programs (e.g., when people with higher salaries get higher 
unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a 
beneficiary, or potential beneficiary. The purpose of this question is not to 
gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. Responses: (0) There 
are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, 
unemployment, poverty programs). (1) Almost all of the welfare state policies 
are means-tested. (2) Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant 
portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in 
the population. (3) The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided 
between means-tested and universalistic. (4) Most welfare state policies are 
universalistic, but a significant portion (e.g., ¼ or 1/3) are means-tested. (5) 
Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion 
is means-tested. 
2016) 
   
Universalism Index Additive index, aggregating across programs for six major areas of risk covered 
in SPAW. Each area is scored 0 if no program; 1 if program is means-tested 
according to some property criterion (income-based exclusions are not 
considered means-tested); 2 if one social group is covered by a contribution- or 
employment-based program; 3 if two groups are covered, etc. The social groups 
counted are agricultural workers; industrial/production workers; small-firm 
workers; self-employed; students; employers; temporary/casual workers; 
family/domestic workers. If the program automatically includes all citizens, 9 is 
given. 
SPAW, 
Rasmussen 
(2017) 
RR Sickness Percentage of net average workers wages replaced by net unemployment 
benefits 
Korpi and Palme 
(2007) 
   
Coverage of labor 
force for sickness 
Percentage of labor force insured for scikness in state legislated insurance Korpi and Palme 
(2007) 
   
Social expenditure Total social transfer spending divided by GDP, as defined by the ILO Armingeon et. al 
(2017) 
   
Population  The population count, log-transformed Miller (2015) 
   
GDP per capita  Real, PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, log-transformed.  V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Polyarchy Democracy index from V-dem, capturing “electoral democracy”: The electoral 
principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers 
responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the 
electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political 
and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not 
marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the 
composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is 
freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting 
alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the VDem conceptual 
scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other 
conception of (representative) democracy – liberal, participatory, deliberative, 
egalitarian, or some other 
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
BMR democracy Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. 
Countries coded democratic have (1) political leaders that are chosen through 
free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level of suffrage. 
Boix, Miller & 
Rosato (2013) 
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Electoral rules  What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral 
chamber of the legislature? (MAJ, PR and Mixed) 
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Urbanization The population living in areas classified as urban according to the criteria of 
each area or country  
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Openness Imports and exports divided by GDP V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Income inequality 
(Gini)  
Distribution of income within the population expressed as a Gini coefficient. V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Family farms What percentage of (cultivated) land area is comprised of family farms? Vanhanen 
(2003) 
   
Union density Share of wage-and salary earners unionized Rasmussen & 
Pontusson 
(2017) 
   
Left Left party control over the executive Brambor et al.( 
2014) 
   
Inter-state. war Did the country participate in an international armed conflict? Coded 1 if the 
country participated in an international armed conflict in a given year, 0 
otherwise. 
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Civil war Was there a civil war, if yes 1 and 0 otherwise. Civil war - at least one intra-state 
war with at least 1,000 battle deaths for each country-year. 
 
   
Political corruption 
index 
How pervasive is political corruption? The directionality of the V-Dem 
corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt (unlike the other V-
Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic 
situation). The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of 
corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, 
distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the 
executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly 
pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they 
differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive (at the 
level of the rulers/cabinet) on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on 
the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: 
both ‘petty’ and ‘grand’; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and 
influencing law making and that affecting implementation. 
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Impartial  
Administration 
Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties? 
This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by 
the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public 
administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (i.e., nepotism, 
cronyism, or discrimination). 
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Civil society 
participation index  
Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymaker; how large is the 
involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and 
is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly 
decentralized or made through party primaries? 
V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Women political  Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions? Women’s V-Dem 
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participation index political participation is understood to include women’s descriptive 
representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of 
power. 
(Coppedge et al. 
2016) 
   
Regions In which politico-geographic region is this country located? QOG Standard 
Dataset (Teorell 
et al. 2017) 
   
Military Expenditure  Military Expenditure in percent of GDP QOG Standard 
Dataset (Teorell 
et al. 2017) 
   
Public order 
spending 
Expenditures for Public order as share of GDP GSRE (Lucas 
and Richter 
2016) 
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Appendix A2: Descriptive statistics 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics calculated for set of observations included in different model specifications in Table 1 
Descriptive statistics model 2 
 mean sd min max 
Encompassing SPAW 3.872116 1.813163 0 6 
Party instit. .6008432 .2814032 .0094183 .9858114 
Population 9.160203 1.32417 5.70711 13.82988 
GDP (Log) 7.938213 .9899841 5.315224 10.31559 
Polyarchy .4381009 .2825434 .0451607 .9434598 
Electoral rules .5159246 .6277793 0 2 
 
Descriptive statistics model 5 
 mean sd min max 
Universalism v-dem .4003045 1.256938 -3.029935 3.232383 
Party instit. .5906694 .2813186 .0094183 .9858114 
Population 9.101019 1.319481 5.70711 13.82988 
GDP (Log) 7.899548 .9911748 5.315224 10.31559 
Polyarchy .4287395 .2807155 .0451607 .9434598 
Electoral rules .4968474 .6210276 0 2 
 
Descriptive statistics model 7 
 mean sd min max 
Universalism SPAW 14.65765 9.710052 0 44 
Party instit. .5572577 .2858848 .0094183 .9858114 
Population 9.125517 1.298291 6.045005 13.81357 
GDP (Log) 7.807652 .9138105 5.831149 10.2353 
Polyarchy .3879448 .262731 .0460888 .9385647 
Electoral rules .5100671 .615974 0 2 
 
Descriptive statistics model 8 
 mean sd min max 
Replacement Rate .4978774 .2981646 0 1 
Party instit. .8978448 .0813805 .3371783 .9841773 
Population 9.485884 1.266021 7.309212 12.53666 
GDP (Log) 9.133489 .6073762 7.340148 10.26472 
Polyarchy .8103145 .1329457 .0561946 .9410231 
Electoral rules .6692015 .5533401 0 2 
 
Descriptive statistics model 9 
 mean sd min max 
Coverage Rate .5730861 .3686468 0 1 
Party instit. .8983119 .0808401 .3371783 .9841773 
Population 9.477103 1.255307 7.309212 12.53666 
GDP (Log) 9.135121 .6030734 7.340148 10.26472 
Polyarchy .8109987 .1320663 .0561946 .9410231 
Electoral rules .6741573 .5506377 0 2 
 
Descriptive statistics model 10  
 mean sd min max 
Social expenditure 12.44573 3.87917 2.332729 23.40068 
Party instit. .9133512 .0665409 .140586 .9841773 
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Population 9.539515 1.114413 7.77191 12.53718 
GDP (Log) 9.508592 .3669328 7.991538 10.31559 
Polyarchy .8538067 .1096984 .0753926 .9378571 
Electoral rules .7784891 .5343083 0 2 
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Appendix A3: Sample 
Table A3. Country years included in Model 1, Table 1 
Country:                      Time Period 
Albania  1914-2007  
Argentina 1900-2007  
Armenia  1992-2007  
Austria  1918-1937*1947-2007  
Azerbaijan  1992-2007  
Belarus  1992-2007  
Belgium 1900-2007  
Benin  1960-1999  
Bolivia  1900-1999  
Brazil 1900-2007  
Bulgaria  1900-2007  
Burkina Faso  1955-2007  
Burundi  1950-1999  
Cameroon  1961-2000  
Cape Verde  1976-2007  
Central African Republic  1961-2007  
Chad  1961-2000  
Chile 1900-2007  
Colombia  1900-1999  
Congo  1957-2000  
Costa Rica 1900-2007  
Cote d'Ivoire  1961-2000  
Cyprus  1943-2007  
Czech Republic  1994-2007  
Democratic Republic of Congo 1961-2007  
Denmark  1900-2007  
Dominican Republic  1900-1931  
Ecuador  1900-2007  
El Salvador 1900-2007  
Estonia  1920-1939*-2007  
Finland  1908-2007  
France 1900-2007  
Gabon  1961-2007  
Gambia  1966-2007  
Georgia  1992-2007  
German Democratic Republic  1950-1989  
Germany 1900-2007  
Ghana  1958-2007  
Greece  1900-2007  
Guatemala  1900-2000  
Guyana  1901-2007  
Haiti  1900-2007  
Honduras  1900-2007  
Hungary  1919-2007  
Iceland  1947-2007  
Ireland  1919-1999  
Italy 1900-2007  
Kenya  1964-2007  
Latvia  1920-1939*1991-2007  
Liberia  1900-2007  
Lithuania  1920-1939*1991-2007  
Mali  1961-2007  
Mauritania  1961-2000  
Mexico  1900-2007  
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Moldova  1992-2007  
Netherlands 1900-2007  
Nicaragua 1900-2007  
Niger  1955-2007  
Nigeria  1942-2007  
Norway  1900-2007  
Panama  1904-2007  
Paraguay 1900-2007  
Peru 1900-2007  
Poland  1920-2007  
Portugal 1900-2007  
Romania 1900-2007  
Russia 1900-2007  
Rwanda  1963-2000  
Senegal  1953-2007  
Serbia 1900-2007  
Slovak Republic  1994-2007  
Slovenia  1992-2007  
Spain 1900-2007  
Sweden  1900-2006  
Switzerland 1900-2007  
Tanzania  1949-2007  
Togo  1953-2011  
Trinidad  1901-1949  
Trinidad and Tobago  1950-2007  
Uganda  1963-2000  
Ukraine  1992-2007  
United Kingdom 1900-2007  
Uruguay 1900-2007  
USA  1900-2007  
Venezuela 1900-2007  
Yugoslavia  1920-2007  
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Appendix A4: Additional analysis on different welfare measures 
– alternative control strategies 
Table A4. Party institutionalization and universalism (Coverage) and generosity (Replacement rates), using CEWD data on 
sickness benefits programs. Time series extend from 1970- 2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable RR 
for singles 
RR 
for singles 
RR 
for Couples 
RR 
for Couples 
Coverage Coverage 
Party inst.  0.092** 0.045 0.075* 0.044 1.24*** 1.20** 
 (2.66) (0.70) (2.27) (0.62) (4.06) (2.91) 
Polyarchy  0.10  0.16*  -0.073 
  (1.63)  (2.27)  (-1.09) 
Population (logged)  0.034  0.090  -0.078 
  (0.74)  (1.40)  (-1.38) 
GDP (log)  0.50***  0.19**  0.056 
  (7.86)  (3.09)  (1.36) 
PR  -0.087***  -0.12***  0.021 
  (-4.31)  (-4.13)  (1.13) 
Mixed  -0.040*  -0.045  0.028 
  (-2.35)  (-1.88)  (1.89) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 764 594 764 594 700 554 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors.. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A5. Replicating main models using the SPAW Universalism Index as DV 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Level/Change DV L L C 
Party ints. 2.63*** 2.05*** 0.061 
 (7.29) (5.24) (0.40) 
Polyarchy  0.73 0.30 
  (1.82) (1.89) 
Population (logged)  1.12*** 0.42*** 
  (3.52) (3.51) 
GDP (log)  0.47* 0.19* 
  (2.10) (2.18) 
PR  0.53** 0.065 
  (2.69) (0.82) 
Mixed  1.90*** 0.13 
  (7.52) (1.08) 
LDV   -0.13*** 
   (-9.93) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4056 4056 4056 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A6. Replicating main models using public vs particularistic goods measure(v2dlencmps from V-Dem) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Level/Change L L C 
Party ints. 1.54*** 1.26*** 0.22*** 
 (21.47) (16.46) (7.14) 
Polyarchy  0.57*** 0.025 
  (9.00) (0.98) 
Population (logged)  0.17*** -0.021 
  (4.05) (-1.33) 
GDP (log)  0.080* -0.017 
  (2.56) (-1.39) 
PR  -0.052 0.0064 
  (-1.50) (0.50) 
Mixed  -0.27*** -0.025 
  (-6.91) (-1.59) 
LDV   -0.093*** 
   (-15.35) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7124 7124 7124 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A7. Party institutionalization on various welfare state measures. Models without controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Encompassingn
. 
Univ. 
V-dem 
Univ. 
SPAW 
RR Coverage Social exp. 
PI 0.59**
* 
0.11*** 1.31*** 0.11*** 0.51 0.014 0.96**
* 
0.26 0.93**
* 
0.79** 5.95**
* 
1.87*** 
 (8.80) (4.35) (30.73
) 
(9.34) (1.51
) 
(0.14) (9.12) (0.85) (7.41) (2.97) (4.62) (2.60) 
LDV  0.90***  0.95***  0.92***  0.68***  0.61**
* 
 0.934**
* 
  (178.53
) 
 (352.32
) 
 (113.47
) 
 (12.15
) 
 (6.23)  (69.71) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation
s 
9053 8878 16267 16089 5857 5678 334 232 338 236 1002 974 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors.* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A8. Party institutionalization on welfare state universalism measures holding welfare state size constant.  
Dependent variable: V-dem Universalism SPAW Universalism 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party instit.  1.62*** 1.48*** 0.23*** 0.20 1.41*** 0.11 
 (28.51) (18.11) (8.00) (0.74) (4.29) (0.72) 
Number of major welfare laws 0.097*** 0.046*** -0.0023 3.07*** 3.15*** 0.78*** 
 (11.51) (4.07) (-0.52) (53.33) (37.11) (14.74) 
LDV   -0.092***   -0.20*** 
   (-13.74)   (-14.16) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9053 6154 6143 5674 4055 3939 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. Constant, fixed time, country effects and controls 
(GDP [Log], population [Log], electoral rules and Polyarchy) excluded. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix A5: Replicating indicator-specific tests (from Table 2 
in paper) for all welfare measures 
Table A9. Party institutionalization indicators on Encompassingess (from SPAW) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party organizations 0.049***     -0.030 
 (3.60)     (-1.53) 
Party branches  0.072***    0.050* 
  (4.81)    (2.25) 
Party linkages   0.048**   0.031 
   (3.10)   (1.70) 
Distinct party platforms    0.062***  0.040* 
    (4.60)  (2.33) 
Legislative party cohesion     0.081*** 0.076*** 
     (4.91) (4.36) 
Pop 1.20*** 1.18*** 1.19*** 1.19*** 1.20*** 1.18*** 
 (27.50) (27.04) (27.33) (27.37) (27.63) (27.00) 
GDP  0.19*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 
 (5.11) (4.79) (4.83) (4.97) (4.74) (4.15) 
Polyarchy -0.37*** -0.39*** -0.34*** -0.39*** -0.21** -0.36*** 
 (-5.36) (-5.69) (-4.83) (-5.44) (-3.03) (-4.71) 
PR 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.58*** 0.56*** 
 (16.42) (16.48) (15.63) (15.72) (16.48) (15.66) 
Mixed 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 
 (11.51) (11.46) (11.42) (11.16) (11.43) (11.10) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6154 6154 6142 6142 6110 6110 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A10. Party institutionalization indicators on SPAW Universalism Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party organizations 0.26***     -0.16 
 (3.72)     (-1.40) 
Party branches  0.48***    0.50*** 
  (5.98)    (3.95) 
Party linkages   0.23*   0.14 
   (2.23)   (1.26) 
Distinct party platforms    0.39***  0.14 
    (5.27)  (1.43) 
Legislative party cohesion     -0.085 -0.11 
     (-0.91) (-1.19) 
Pop 0.95** 0.77* 0.96** 0.84** 0.92** 0.66* 
 (2.97) (2.41) (3.02) (2.62) (2.86) (2.08) 
GDP  0.44 0.32 0.40 0.37 0.49* 0.28 
 (1.94) (1.37) (1.74) (1.62) (2.14) (1.19) 
Polyarchy 1.05** 0.67 1.37*** 0.83* 1.44*** 0.32 
 (2.62) (1.68) (3.55) (2.05) (3.57) (0.73) 
PR 0.65** 0.66*** 0.56** 0.58** 0.65** 0.60** 
 (3.26) (3.33) (2.78) (2.92) (3.24) (2.96) 
Mixed 2.12*** 2.11*** 2.11*** 2.11*** 2.14*** 2.13*** 
 (7.22) (7.13) (7.16) (7.17) (7.27) (7.15) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4172 4172 4169 4169 4152 4152 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A11. Party institutionalization on replacement rates for sickness insurance (from SCIP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party organizations 0.30***     0.29*** 
 (7.32)     (6.91) 
Party branches  0.089*    0.025 
  (2.45)    (0.78) 
Party linkages   0.11***   0.081** 
   (3.52)   (2.80) 
Distinct party platforms    0.090*  -0.027 
    (2.14)  (-0.71) 
Legislative party cohesion     -0.0020 0.014 
     (-0.07) (0.61) 
Pop -0.12 -0.11 -0.18* -0.15 -0.14 -0.15* 
 (-1.62) (-1.31) (-2.16) (-1.81) (-1.56) (-2.02) 
GDP  0.057 0.022 0.042 0.069 0.063 0.026 
 (1.22) (0.36) (0.80) (1.25) (1.11) (0.53) 
Polyarchy -0.31** -0.052 -0.0036 -0.10 0.10 -0.34* 
 (-2.69) (-0.38) (-0.03) (-0.66) (0.81) (-2.47) 
PR 0.064 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.067 
 (1.06) (1.70) (1.50) (1.87) (1.49) (1.03) 
Mixed -0.0017 0.089 0.040 0.070 0.027 0.017 
 (-0.03) (1.10) (0.49) (0.85) (0.32) (0.25) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 263 263 263 263 263 263 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A12. Party institutionalization indicators on coverage rates for sickness insurance (from SCIP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party organizations 0.31***     0.29*** 
 (6.36)     (5.89) 
Party branches  0.037    -0.061 
  (1.07)    (-1.93) 
Party linkages   0.13***   0.075* 
   (3.66)   (2.25) 
Distinct party platforms    0.16***  0.060 
    (3.46)  (1.32) 
Legislative party cohesion     -0.058* -0.040* 
     (-2.50) (-1.97) 
Pop 0.016 0.0084 -0.054 -0.033 0.038 -0.016 
 (0.17) (0.07) (-0.51) (-0.31) (0.32) (-0.17) 
GDP  0.28*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 
 (5.84) (4.68) (5.12) (5.62) (5.35) (6.01) 
Polyarchy -0.22* 0.14 0.080 -0.17 0.18 -0.31* 
 (-2.05) (1.09) (0.77) (-1.05) (1.93) (-2.12) 
PR -0.13** -0.066 -0.077 -0.043 -0.12** -0.16** 
 (-2.87) (-1.62) (-1.96) (-1.09) (-2.69) (-3.09) 
Mixed -0.13* -0.075 -0.086 -0.025 -0.12** -0.15** 
 (-2.49) (-1.37) (-1.96) (-0.52) (-2.69) (-2.64) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A13. Party institutionalization indicators on social security spending as share of GDP (from CPDS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party organizations -0.067     -0.24 
 (-0.23)     (-0.75) 
Party branches  -0.068    0.10 
  (-0.21)    (0.27) 
Party linkages   0.52*   0.47 
   (2.12)   (1.78) 
Distinct party platforms    0.12  -0.026 
    (0.44)  (-0.09) 
Legislative party cohesion     0.44* 0.39* 
     (2.43) (2.07) 
Pop -4.35*** -4.40*** -4.44*** -4.39*** -4.58*** -4.53*** 
 (-5.38) (-5.16) (-5.36) (-5.34) (-5.12) (-4.80) 
GDP  1.16 1.19 0.73 1.14 1.17 0.73 
 (1.41) (1.47) (0.85) (1.39) (1.41) (0.86) 
Polyarchy 3.36** 3.28*** 2.88*** 2.99** 2.99*** 3.32** 
 (3.02) (3.39) (3.29) (2.99) (3.50) (2.78) 
PR -0.83 -0.82 -1.07 -0.96 -0.37 -0.54 
 (-1.42) (-1.35) (-1.87) (-1.52) (-0.58) (-0.78) 
Mixed -1.57** -1.62** -1.82*** -1.64** -1.24* -1.38* 
 (-2.99) (-2.86) (-3.49) (-3.00) (-2.29) (-2.30) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 781 781 781 781 781 781 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A14. Party institutionalization indicators on public goods measure (from V-Dem) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party organizations 0.23***     0.13*** 
 (15.86)     (6.53) 
Party branches  0.25***    0.14*** 
  (15.48)    (6.74) 
Party linkages   0.38***   0.34*** 
   (25.87)   (22.23) 
Distinct party platforms    0.088***  -0.17*** 
    (5.66)  (-10.22) 
Legislative party cohesion     0.17*** 0.11*** 
     (11.09) (7.33) 
Pop 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.18*** 
 (5.69) (4.38) (5.19) (5.66) (6.02) (4.62) 
GDP  0.096** 0.056 0.011 0.090** 0.079* -0.0034 
 (3.05) (1.81) (0.37) (2.86) (2.48) (-0.11) 
Polyarchy 0.66*** 0.69*** 0.66*** 0.92*** 1.32*** 0.75*** 
 (10.55) (10.99) (10.53) (14.15) (21.19) (11.53) 
PR -0.031 -0.031 -0.12*** -0.048 0.0010 -0.064 
 (-0.89) (-0.91) (-3.37) (-1.35) (0.03) (-1.94) 
Mixed -0.25*** -0.26*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.27*** 
 (-6.53) (-6.77) (-7.47) (-6.93) (-7.04) (-7.26) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7137 7137 7125 7125 7093 7093 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix A6: Replicating core robustness tests (from Table 3 
in paper) for all welfare measures, plus tests on alternative 
control sets 
Table A15. Party institutionalization on Encompassingness (from SPAW)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Baseline 
5 year 
lag 
10 year 
lag 
Socio- 
econ. 
controls 
Work. 
class 
controls 
Instit. and 
civil society 
controls 
First 
component  
PI 
Control 
linkages 
Random 
effects 
model 
Party Instit. 0.42*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.11 1.40*** 0.44*** 0.088*** 0.39*** 0.48 
 (5.85) (4.02) (4.65) (1.60) (8.09) (5.51) (6.16) (4.80) (1.84) 
Polyarchy -0.44*** -0.26*** -0.21*** -0.19** -0.41** -0.43*** -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.47** 
 (-6.30) (-3.98) (-3.36) (-3.22) (-2.84) (-3.69) (-6.26) (-6.24) (-2.72) 
Population 1.17*** 1.21*** 1.24*** 0.75*** 1.08*** 1.23*** 1.18*** 1.17*** 0.88*** 
 (26.99) (27.79) (27.32) (11.19) (10.22) (26.75) (27.26) (26.97) (6.77) 
GDP  0.18*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.45*** -0.028 0.12** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.19 
 (4.98) (5.80) (5.98) (9.02) (-0.30) (2.89) (4.63) (4.86) (1.19) 
PR 0.55*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.17*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.62*** 
 (16.22) (15.55) (15.40) (4.58) (7.20) (13.86) (15.94) (15.67) (4.55) 
Mixed 0.52*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.15** 0.78*** 0.46*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 
 (11.37) (10.90) (10.82) (2.77) (8.35) (9.60) (11.26) (11.30) (3.85) 
Urbaniz    -5.8e-
09*** 
     
    (-9.01)      
Openness    0.0061***      
    (3.31)      
Income ineq.    0.013***      
    (9.00)      
Fam. farms    0.0035***      
    (3.52)      
Union Dens.     0.0045***     
     (4.09)     
Left     -0.027     
     (-0.80)     
Inter-st. war      -0.088*    
      (-2.15)    
Civil war      -0.016    
      (-0.36)    
Corruption      -0.21    
      (-1.62)    
Imp. Admin.      0.097***    
      (4.95)    
Female parti.      -0.92***    
      (-10.31)    
Civil society      -0.21*    
      (-2.02)    
Party linkages        0.013  
        (0.76)  
Country 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6154 6009 5796 3663 1496 5287 6110 6142 6154 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A16. Party institutionalization on Universalism Index (from SPAW) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Baseline 
5 year 
lag 
10 
year 
lag 
Socio- 
econ. controls 
Work. 
class 
controls 
Instit. and 
civil society 
controls 
First 
component  
PI 
Control 
linkages 
Random 
effects 
model 
Party Instit. 1.90*** 1.24*** 0.39 -0.080 9.69*** 2.02*** 0.42*** 1.75*** 2.05 
 (4.81) (3.43) (1.12) (-0.19) (4.22) (4.65) (5.33) (4.00) (1.36) 
Polyarchy 0.70 1.56*** 1.95*** 0.41 -7.83*** 0.68 0.81* 0.70 0.85 
 (1.69) (4.26) (5.40) (0.94) (-3.49) (1.02) (2.03) (1.70) (0.62) 
Population 0.81* 0.88** 0.75* -0.17 4.96** 1.40*** 0.86** 0.83** 0.82 
 (2.56) (2.82) (2.36) (-0.32) (3.29) (4.30) (2.70) (2.59) (0.96) 
GDP  0.40 0.45* 0.34 1.29*** -0.25 0.088 0.38 0.38 1.04 
 (1.76) (2.11) (1.57) (4.80) (-0.20) (0.36) (1.67) (1.65) (1.08) 
PR 0.63** 0.51** 0.54** -0.24 -0.96 0.79*** 0.63** 0.60** 0.84 
 (3.17) (2.63) (2.71) (-1.01) (-1.20) (3.64) (3.16) (2.97) (1.32) 
Mixed 2.13*** 1.81*** 1.91*** 1.27*** -1.20 2.42*** 2.09*** 2.12*** 2.28** 
 (7.22) (7.66) (7.92) (3.68) (-1.28) (8.05) (7.09) (7.19) (2.63) 
Urbaniz    -
0.000000060*** 
     
    (-11.43)      
Openness    0.043*      
    (2.29)      
Income ineq.    0.0074      
    (0.72)      
Fam. farms    -0.0068      
    (-0.97)      
Union Dens.     0.092***     
     (5.06)     
Left     1.04*     
     (2.29)     
Inter-st. war      -1.24***    
      (-4.82)    
Civil war      0.26    
      (1.33)    
Corruption      -1.58*    
      (-2.13)    
Imp. Admin.      0.80***    
      (6.95)    
Female parti.      -1.23*    
      (-2.07)    
Civil society      -3.27***    
      (-6.23)    
Party linkages        0.091  
        (0.82)  
Country 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4172 4075 3930 2416 743 3512 4152 4169 4172 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A17. Party Institutionalization on replacement rates for sickness insurance (from SCIP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Baseline 
5 year 
lag 
10 
year 
lag 
Socio- 
econ. 
controls 
Work. 
class 
controls 
Instit. and 
civil society 
controls 
First 
component  
PI 
Control 
linkages 
Random 
effects 
model 
Party Instit. 1.63
*** 0.19 0.077 1.57* 1.61*** 1.76*** 0.28*** 1.57*** 1.61*** 
 (8.03) (1.77) (0.88) (2.27) (8.41) (6.48) (6.08) (7.21) (3.30) 
Polyarchy -0.54*** 0.038 0.095 -0.32 -0.33* -0.54** -0.41** -0.54*** -0.52 
 (-3.86) (0.29) (0.76) (-1.09) (-2.56) (-3.28) (-2.96) (-3.84) (-1.61) 
Pop. (ln) -0.19* -0.14 -0.13 -0.32* -0.10 -0.28** -0.20* -0.19* -0.050 
 (-2.31) (-1.61) (-1.56) (-2.04) (-1.28) (-3.20) (-2.41) (-2.36) (-0.95) 
GDP pc (ln)  0.018 0.038 0.049 0.043 -0.034 0.040 -0.00076 0.016 -0.018 
 (0.37) (0.61) (0.86) (0.41) (-0.72) (0.70) (-0.01) (0.33) (-0.15) 
PR 0.071 0.15 0.13 -0.30* 0.033 0.13 0.17* 0.072 0.13* 
 (1.26) (1.76) (1.53) (-2.21) (0.61) (1.70) (2.46) (1.26) (2.30) 
Mixed 0.12 0.051 0.035 -0.20 0.080 0.17* 0.15* 0.12 0.19 
 (1.95) (0.61) (0.41) (-1.58) (1.34) (2.26) (2.08) (1.93) (1.84) 
Urbaniz.    5.9e-10      
    (0.33)      
Openness    -0.0086**      
    (-2.96)      
Income ineq.     -0.00010      
    (-0.06)      
Fam. farms    -0.00088      
    (-0.36)      
Union dens.     0.0054***     
     (6.36)     
Left     0.0078     
     (0.41)     
Corruption      -0.74    
      (-1.73)    
Imp. Admin.      0.037    
      (1.41)    
Civil society      -0.047    
      (-0.43)    
Female parti.      -0.60***    
      (-3.32)    
Party link.        0.019  
        (0.60)  
Country 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 263 261 261 182 250 263 263 263 263 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A18. Party Institutionalization on coverage rates for sickness insurance (from SCIP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Baseline 
5 year 
lag 
10 year 
lag 
Socio- 
econ. 
controls 
Work. 
class 
controls 
Instit. and 
civil 
society 
controls 
First 
component  
PI 
Control 
linkages 
Random 
effects 
model 
Party Instit. 1.27
*** 0.47*** 0.24** 3.95*** 1.24*** 1.38*** 0.26*** 1.08*** 1.26 
 (5.40) (3.52) (3.14) (5.06) (5.57) (5.00) (5.16) (4.28) (1.80) 
Polyarchy -0.30* 0.021 0.18 0.22 -0.095 -0.38* -0.27 -0.29* -0.33 
 (-2.10) (0.17) (1.80) (0.95) (-0.76) (-2.41) (-1.93) (-2.04) (-0.90) 
Pop. (ln) -0.041 -0.016 -
0.0024 
0.35* 0.046 -0.064 -0.055 -0.061 -0.078 
 (-0.38) (-0.14) (-0.02) (2.47) (0.43) (-0.68) (-0.51) (-0.58) (-0.85) 
GDP pc (ln)  0.25*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.19* 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.23* 
 (4.94) (4.03) (4.48) (2.24) (5.02) (4.87) (4.37) (4.91) (2.25) 
PR -0.11* -0.020 -0.070 -0.048 -0.15* 0.025 -0.031 -0.11* 0.025 
 (-2.32) (-0.39) (-1.60) (-0.53) (-2.55) (0.49) (-0.66) (-2.40) (0.27) 
Mixed -0.025 -0.038 -0.068 0.019 -0.048 0.044 0.0095 -0.029 0.062 
 (-0.42) (-0.68) (-1.34) (0.23) (-0.72) (0.81) (0.16) (-0.52) (0.65) 
Urbaniz.    -2.9e-09*      
    (-2.05)      
Openness    -0.00043      
    (-0.19)      
Income ineq.     -0.0016      
    (-1.08)      
Fam. farms    0.00081      
    (0.44)      
Union dens.     0.0050***     
     (4.57)     
Left     0.027     
     (1.43)     
Corruption      0.14    
      (0.40)    
Imp. Admin.      0.13***    
      (4.16)    
Civil society      -0.13    
      (-1.13)    
Female parti.      -0.48**    
      (-2.71)    
Party link.        0.065  
        (1.77)  
Country 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 267 265 265 186 254 267 267 267 267 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A19. Party institutionalization on social expenditure as share of GDP (from CPDS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Baseline 
5 year 
lag 
10 year 
lag 
Socio- 
econ. controls 
Work. 
class 
controls 
Instit. and 
civil society 
controls 
First 
component  
PI 
Control 
linkages 
Random 
effects 
model 
Party Instit. 3.69 1.91 -0.079 6.96
** -1.81 -3.63 0.49 2.92 3.49 
 (1.79) (1.88) (-0.11) (2.91) (-0.49) (-1.37) (1.35) (1.47) (0.69) 
Polyarchy 1.61 2.55** 3.12*** -0.57 2.77 1.58 2.16 1.69 1.09 
 (1.36) (2.88) (3.59) (-0.42) (1.64) (1.06) (1.88) (1.45) (0.36) 
Pop. (ln) -4.43*** -
5.32*** 
-10.6*** -5.07*** -10.2*** -3.59*** -4.40*** -4.48*** -0.88* 
 (-5.39) (-5.10) (-
10.01) 
(-5.09) (-9.48) (-4.77) (-5.32) (-5.36) (-1.97) 
GDP pc (ln)  0.88 0.73 -0.32 -0.66 -0.66 -0.75 0.98 0.56 0.62 
 (1.06) (0.86) (-0.37) (-0.58) (-0.75) (-0.82) (1.18) (0.66) (0.54) 
PR -1.29* -0.95 -0.18 -4.68*** 0.83 -2.81*** -1.05 -1.38* 0.097 
 (-2.17) (-1.60) (-0.30) (-5.82) (1.19) (-4.63) (-1.83) (-2.36) (0.08) 
Mixed -1.70** -1.55** -1.23* -3.36*** -0.39 -2.49*** -1.56** -1.87*** -0.57 
 (-3.26) (-2.98) (-2.41) (-4.93) (-0.69) (-4.25) (-3.02) (-3.61) (-0.34) 
Urbaniz.    0.000000092***      
    (5.02)      
Openness    -0.14***      
    (-5.81)      
Income ineq.     -0.029*      
    (-2.28)      
Fam. farms    -0.0042      
    (-0.26)      
Union dens.     0.039***     
     (4.24)     
Left     -0.42**     
     (-2.59)     
Corruption      -16.3***    
      (-5.75)    
Imp. Admin.      -1.08***    
      (-5.01)    
Civil society      -2.92**    
      (-3.23)    
Female parti.      7.35***    
      (4.21)    
Party link.        0.44  
        (1.83)  
Country 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
          
Year 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 781 777 772 741 704 775 781 781 781 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A20. Party institutionalization on public goods (v2dlencmps from V-Dem) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Baseline 
5 year 
lag 
10 year 
lag 
Socio- 
econ. 
controls 
Work. 
class 
controls 
Instit. and 
civil society 
controls 
First 
component  
PI 
Control 
linkages 
Random 
effects 
model 
Party Instit. 1.26*** 0.59*** 0.12 1.10*** 1.20*** 0.95*** 0.33*** 0.59*** 1.26*** 
 (16.51) (8.10) (1.65) (11.90) (6.63) (13.62) (21.77) (7.42) (3.36) 
Polyarchy 0.57*** 0.94*** 1.08*** 0.86*** 1.40*** -0.27** 0.56*** 0.49*** 0.61* 
 (8.96) (15.07) (17.24) (12.34) (9.78) (-2.86) (8.61) (7.74) (2.08) 
Population 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.28*** -0.43*** 0.35*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.11 
 (4.05) (4.84) (5.71) (4.16) (-4.18) (8.64) (4.79) (4.41) (0.93) 
GDP  0.081** 0.050 0.073* 0.028 -0.30*** 0.045 0.038 0.013 0.084 
 (2.59) (1.54) (2.18) (0.66) (-3.69) (1.54) (1.24) (0.45) (0.70) 
PR -0.050 -0.039 -0.039 -0.11* 0.089 -0.052 -0.074* -0.12*** -0.045 
 (-1.44) (-1.08) (-1.03) (-2.47) (1.46) (-1.70) (-2.16) (-3.55) (-0.32) 
Mixed -0.27*** -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.20*** -0.16** -0.22*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.27 
 (-6.93) (-5.95) (-6.16) (-4.77) (-2.68) (-6.50) (-7.79) (-7.64) (-1.70) 
Urbaniz    -3.6e-
09*** 
     
    (-6.16)      
Openness    0.00080      
    (0.42)      
Income ineq.    -0.0031*      
    (-2.29)      
Fam. farms    0.0071***      
    (5.66)      
Union Dens.     0.00068     
     (0.63)     
Left     0.18***     
     (5.61)     
Inter-st. war      -0.094**    
      (-2.87)    
Civil war      -0.16***    
      (-4.65)    
Corruption      -1.89***    
      (-17.69)    
Imp. Admin.      0.081***    
      (4.95)    
Female parti.      1.30***    
      (18.75)    
Civil society      -0.058    
      (-0.72)    
Party linkages        0.33***  
        (20.27)  
Country 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7137 6975 6732 4208 1635 6116 7093 7125 7137 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
	
	
65 
Table A21. Party institutionalization on coverage of major risks (Encompassingness, from SPAW) including one control at a time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Party Instit. 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.16* 0.44*** 1.20*** 0.67*** 0.41*** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.47*** 0.41*** 
 (5.85) (5.83) (5.91) (2.23) (6.05) (7.25) (5.28) (5.63) (6.28) (5.69) (5.50) (6.19) (5.68) 
Polyarchy  -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.42*** -0.30*** -0.44*** -0.35** -0.71*** -0.44*** -0.46*** -0.44*** -0.66*** -0.30*** -0.52*** 
 (-6.30) (-6.24) (-6.03) (-4.74) (-6.28) (-2.81) (-7.06) (-6.11) (-6.50) (-5.99) (-8.14) (-3.77) (-5.56) 
Pop.  1.17*** 1.22*** 1.20*** 0.60*** 1.17*** 1.00*** 1.18*** 1.23*** 1.19*** 1.17*** 1.19*** 1.14*** 1.16*** 
 (26.99) (27.39) (27.20) (11.55) (26.48) (11.53) (20.32) (27.42) (27.49) (26.98) (27.23) (25.54) (27.00) 
GDP  0.18*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.32*** 0.18*** 0.11 -0.37*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.12** 0.18*** 
 (4.98) (6.02) (6.25) (7.17) (4.67) (1.66) (-5.40) (5.30) (5.47) (4.94) (4.33) (2.96) (5.00) 
PR  0.55*** 0.54*** 0.52*** 0.23*** 0.57*** 0.45*** 0.75*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 
 (16.22) (15.64) (15.52) (5.51) (16.38) (7.00) (14.32) (16.12) (16.24) (16.25) (16.55) (13.47) (15.63) 
Mixed  0.52*** 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.21*** 0.52*** 0.42*** 0.46*** 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.45*** 0.52*** 
 (11.37) (11.41) (11.35) (3.55) (11.12) (6.36) (7.15) (11.41) (11.46) (11.41) (11.47) (9.24) (11.23) 
Urban  -3.7***            
  (-6.61)            
Openness   -0.0046*           
   (-2.28)           
Inc, ineq.     0.014***          
    (9.08)          
Fam. farms     0.0013         
     (1.40)         
Union den.      0.0048***        
      (5.04)        
Left executive       -0.092**       
       (-2.73)       
Inter-state war.         -0.093*      
        (-2.33)      
Civil war         -0.088*     
         (-2.21)     
Corruption          0.0028    
          (0.03)    
Imp. Admin.            0.078***   
           (5.13)   
Women pol.             -0.72***  
            (-8.10)  
Civil society              0.11 
             (1.31) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6154 6003 6052 3860 6051 1832 2449 5852 6140 6154 6154 5553 6154 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A22. Party institutionalization and universalism (v2dlunivl, from V-Dem) including one control at a time.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Party Instit. 1.30*** 1.29*** 1.32*** 1.24*** 1.25*** 1.51*** 1.35*** 1.32*** 1.30*** 1.12*** 1.25*** 1.33*** 1.31*** 
 (16.23) (15.95) (16.28) (11.66) (15.32) (7.50) (11.07) (15.95) (16.28) (14.76) (16.19) (17.84) (16.55) 
Polyarchy  0.35*** 0.40*** 0.33*** 0.53*** 0.43*** 1.24*** 1.37*** 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.049 -0.22** -0.074 0.43*** 
 (5.42) (6.18) (5.03) (7.64) (6.65) (9.38) (16.79) (5.57) (5.10) (0.74) (-2.84) (-1.07) (5.08) 
Pop.  0.10* 0.12** 0.11** 0.67*** 0.090* -0.31*** -0.66*** 0.11** 0.11* 0.11** 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.11** 
 (2.53) (2.92) (2.63) (11.65) (2.16) (-4.32) (-12.99) (2.59) (2.57) (2.76) (3.30) (6.71) (2.67) 
GDP  0.28*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.38*** 0.30*** 0.64*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 
 (9.74) (10.46) (9.76) (12.71) (9.66) (11.19) (5.67) (9.43) (9.18) (7.96) (7.40) (9.97) (9.67) 
PR  0.10** 0.094* 0.075 -0.16*** 0.068 0.53*** 0.48*** 0.093* 0.10** 0.10** 0.12** 0.11** 0.11** 
 (2.65) (2.47) (1.93) (-3.34) (1.78) (9.21) (10.61) (2.43) (2.76) (2.86) (3.19) (3.02) (2.81) 
Mixed  -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.22*** -0.15*** 0.15* 0.41*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.10** -0.14*** -0.070* -0.14*** 
 (-3.80) (-3.78) (-4.02) (-5.28) (-4.01) (2.20) (8.00) (-3.83) (-3.78) (-2.89) (-3.53) (-2.00) (-3.66) 
Urban  -2.9e-09***            
  (-6.35)            
Openness   -0.0029*           
   (-1.97)           
Inc, ineq.     -0.0037**          
    (-2.67)          
Fam. farms     0.0029***         
     (3.48)         
Union den.      0.0085***        
      (8.18)        
Left executive       0.13***       
       (4.97)       
Inter-state war.         -0.040      
        (-1.13)      
Civil war         -0.21***     
         (-6.02)     
Corruption          -1.53***    
          (-15.34)    
Imp. Admin.            0.21***   
           (14.80)   
Women pol.             2.02***  
            (27.29)  
Civil society              -0.11 
             (-1.27) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7137 6986 6987 4447 6981 1994 2604 6779 7122 7137 7137 6435 7137 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A23. Party institutionalization and universalism (Universalism Index; SPAW) including one control at a time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Party Instit.  1.90*** 1.87*** 1.81*** -0.42 2.11*** 5.62*** 7.02*** 1.81*** 2.07*** 1.73*** 1.74*** 1.80*** 2.06*** 
 (4.81) (4.52) (4.67) (-0.99) (5.34) (3.34) (8.07) (4.45) (5.33) (4.43) (4.45) (4.12) (5.22) 
Polyarchy  0.70 0.74 1.08** 0.27 0.60 -2.47 -5.79*** 0.71 0.57 0.14 -1.20** 0.37 1.66** 
 (1.69) (1.73) (2.73) (0.56) (1.46) (-1.92) (-7.33) (1.69) (1.39) (0.34) (-2.60) (0.79) (3.04) 
Pop.  0.81* 1.00** 0.61* -1.37** 0.61 3.76** 2.06*** 1.03** 0.87** 0.85** 0.93** 0.81* 0.92** 
 (2.56) (3.09) (1.97) (-2.64) (1.92) (3.06) (4.69) (3.20) (2.75) (2.67) (2.94) (2.48) (2.86) 
GDP  0.40 0.67** 0.71** 0.89*** 0.24 -0.58 -0.070 0.29 0.47* 0.35 0.16 0.35 0.41 
 (1.76) (2.86) (3.07) (3.43) (0.98) (-0.93) (-0.11) (1.20) (2.12) (1.53) (0.69) (1.43) (1.79) 
PR  0.63** 0.51* 0.72*** 0.063 0.72*** 0.44 -0.97* 0.61** 0.63** 0.61** 0.67*** 0.58** 0.72*** 
 (3.17) (2.51) (3.78) (0.24) (3.63) (0.70) (-1.99) (3.04) (3.18) (3.05) (3.40) (2.62) (3.57) 
Mixed  2.13*** 2.22*** 2.14*** 1.95*** 1.93*** -0.059 0.93* 2.30*** 2.09*** 2.13*** 2.21*** 2.07*** 2.16*** 
 (7.22) (7.42) (8.22) (4.64) (6.50) (-0.10) (2.11) (7.55) (7.57) (7.17) (7.47) (6.74) (7.35) 
Urban  -0.000000041***            
  (-11.09)            
Openness   -0.040*           
   (-2.35)           
Inc, ineq.     0.022          
    (1.75)          
Fam. farms     0.0049         
     (0.98)         
Union den.      0.065***        
      (4.56)        
Left        0.79**       
       (2.76)       
Inter-state war.         -1.16***      
        (-4.70)      
Civil war         -0.076     
         (-0.44)     
Corruption          -2.51***    
          (-4.38)    
Imp. Admin.            0.72***   
           (8.68)   
Women pol.             0.94  
            (1.59)  
Civil society              -1.24** 
             (-2.83) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4172 4049 4118 2570 4101 959 1339 3968 4162 4172 4172 3686 4172 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A24. Party institutionalization and replacement rates for sickness insurance (from SCIP) including one control at a time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Party Instit  1.63*** 1.39*** 1.28*** 1.46* 1.67*** 1.61*** 1.62*** 1.44*** 1.55*** 1.63*** 2.01*** 
 (8.03) (6.87) (5.95) (2.18) (8.12) (8.39) (8.06) (5.98) (7.85) (8.04) (8.18) 
Polyarchy  -0.54*** -0.34* -0.20 -0.67*** -0.59*** -0.33* -0.53*** -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.50*** -0.41** 
 (-3.86) (-2.40) (-1.26) (-3.50) (-4.07) (-2.57) (-3.83) (-4.19) (-4.05) (-3.39) (-2.89) 
Pop.  -0.19* -0.050 -0.087 -0.34* -0.11 -0.11 -0.19* -0.23** -0.19* -0.17* -0.24** 
 (-2.31) (-0.60) (-1.05) (-2.16) (-1.07) (-1.29) (-2.30) (-2.72) (-2.40) (-2.14) (-2.83) 
GDP  0.018 0.056 0.100 0.0011 0.0071 -0.033 0.016 0.044 0.032 -0.0026 0.012 
 (0.37) (1.20) (1.61) (0.01) (0.14) (-0.70) (0.32) (0.82) (0.62) (-0.05) (0.24) 
PR  0.071 0.052 0.023 -0.20 0.081 0.035 0.066 0.088 0.11 0.093 0.069 
 (1.26) (0.90) (0.37) (-1.77) (1.40) (0.65) (1.15) (1.38) (1.73) (1.49) (1.18) 
Mixed  0.12 0.096 0.081 -0.12 0.13* 0.080 0.12 0.15* 0.14* 0.14* 0.12 
 (1.95) (1.47) (1.15) (-1.17) (2.00) (1.35) (1.92) (2.16) (2.14) (2.07) (1.88) 
Urban  -3.4e-09***          
  (-6.50)          
Openness   -0.0082***         
   (-5.76)         
Inc, ineq.     -0.0012        
    (-0.63)        
Fam. farms     0.0021       
     (1.48)       
Union den.      0.0054***      
      (6.36)      
Left        0.019     
       (0.88)     
Corruption        -0.75    
        (-1.87)    
Imp. Admin.          0.042   
         (1.56)   
Women pol.           -0.12  
          (-1.06)  
Civil society            -0.60*** 
           (-3.38) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 263 263 259 184 263 250 263 263 263 263 263 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A25. Party institutionalization and coverage rates for sickness insurance (from SCIP) including one control at a time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Party Instit.  1.27*** 1.07*** 1.06*** 3.64*** 1.40*** 1.25*** 1.27*** 1.26*** 1.04*** 1.28*** 1.62*** 
 (5.40) (4.53) (4.21) (4.77) (5.82) (5.56) (5.42) (4.90) (4.88) (5.43) (5.70) 
Polyarchy  -0.30* -0.13 -0.12 -0.35 -0.43** -0.10 -0.29* -0.31* -0.54*** -0.25 -0.19 
 (-2.10) (-0.87) (-0.69) (-1.94) (-2.79) (-0.81) (-2.04) (-2.03) (-3.39) (-1.73) (-1.32) 
Pop.  -0.041 0.077 0.0089 0.22 0.18 0.044 -0.038 -0.045 -0.049 -0.026 -0.085 
 (-0.38) (0.65) (0.08) (1.72) (1.63) (0.40) (-0.35) (-0.39) (-0.54) (-0.24) (-0.81) 
GDP  0.25*** 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.16* 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 
 (4.94) (5.79) (4.94) (2.34) (4.30) (5.09) (4.85) (4.86) (5.64) (4.22) (4.93) 
PR  -0.11* -0.13** -0.12* -0.059 -0.085 -0.14* -0.12* -0.11* 0.0069 -0.087 -0.11* 
 (-2.32) (-2.64) (-2.53) (-0.64) (-1.77) (-2.44) (-2.51) (-2.21) (0.15) (-1.64) (-2.56) 
Mixed  -0.025 -0.049 -0.034 0.012 -0.011 -0.047 -0.026 -0.022 0.035 -0.0068 -0.027 
 (-0.42) (-0.81) (-0.57) (0.15) (-0.20) (-0.70) (-0.44) (-0.38) (0.66) (-0.11) (-0.50) 
Urban  -2.9e-09***          
  (-5.82)          
Openness   -0.0039**         
   (-2.90)         
Inc, ineq.     -0.0030*        
    (-2.13)        
Fam. farms     0.0057***       
     (4.94)       
Union den.      0.0050***      
      (4.58)      
Left        0.038     
       (1.88)     
Corruption        -0.062    
        (-0.18)    
Imp. Admin.          0.13***   
         (4.13)   
Women pol.           -0.13  
          (-1.20)  
Civil society            -0.55** 
           (-2.95) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 267 267 263 188 267 254 267 267 267 267 267 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A26. Party institutionalization and social expenditures as share of GDP (from CPDS) including one control at a time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Party Instit.  3.69 3.67 3.99 4.14 3.64 -2.80 4.50* -4.26 5.84** 4.51* -0.27 
 (1.79) (1.78) (1.95) (1.74) (1.77) (-0.77) (1.98) (-1.70) (2.74) (2.26) (-0.12) 
Polyarchy  1.61 1.62 1.54 0.96 1.76 4.68** 1.32 1.17 2.55* 3.80** -1.79 
 (1.36) (1.36) (1.33) (0.71) (1.46) (2.81) (0.98) (1.01) (2.12) (2.82) (-1.26) 
Pop.  -4.43*** -4.41*** -4.20*** -4.36*** -4.50*** -4.11*** -10.5*** -5.29*** -3.85*** -3.46*** -4.35*** 
 (-5.39) (-5.24) (-5.38) (-5.13) (-5.22) (-4.61) (-9.91) (-6.18) (-4.79) (-4.68) (-5.30) 
GDP  0.88 0.88 0.98 -0.78 1.10 0.87 -0.52 1.50 0.62 0.34 -0.46 
 (1.06) (1.06) (1.18) (-0.77) (1.26) (1.04) (-0.59) (1.80) (0.76) (0.41) (-0.52) 
PR  -1.29* -1.29* -1.71** -2.79*** -1.36* -0.045 -0.66 -2.25*** -1.80** -1.24* -1.06 
 (-2.17) (-2.17) (-2.80) (-3.71) (-2.31) (-0.06) (-1.15) (-4.04) (-2.88) (-2.01) (-1.84) 
Mixed  -1.70** -1.70** -1.93*** -2.78*** -1.74*** -0.82 -1.35** -1.85*** -1.82*** -1.44** -2.20*** 
 (-3.26) (-3.23) (-3.55) (-4.33) (-3.38) (-1.40) (-2.73) (-3.53) (-3.36) (-2.74) (-4.11) 
Urban  -1.1e-09          
  (-0.21)          
Openness   -0.034***         
   (-3.65)         
Inc, ineq.     -0.030*        
    (-2.41)        
Fam. farms     -0.013       
     (-1.01)       
Union den.      0.044***      
      (4.78)      
Left        -0.38*     
       (-2.32)     
Corruption        -19.4***    
        (-6.79)    
Imp. Admin.          -0.91***   
         (-4.00)   
Women pol.           -3.96***  
          (-4.37)  
Civil society            7.28*** 
           (4.02) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 781 781 781 741 781 737 739 781 781 775 781 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A27. Party institutionalization and Public Goods (v2dlencmps from V-Dem) including one control at a time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Party system  1.26*** 1.25*** 1.27*** 1.08*** 1.24*** 0.92*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.26*** 0.95*** 1.20*** 1.20*** 1.27*** 
 (16.51) (16.20) (16.44) (11.75) (16.16) (5.43) (12.11) (16.35) (16.48) (14.10) (16.71) (16.69) (16.64) 
Polyarchy  0.57*** 0.59*** 0.58*** 0.88*** 0.67*** 1.22*** 0.76*** 0.53*** 0.55*** 0.034 -0.18* 0.31*** 0.61*** 
 (8.96) (9.24) (9.01) (12.76) (10.78) (10.14) (9.46) (8.20) (8.65) (0.55) (-2.40) (4.42) (7.35) 
Pop.  0.16*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.34*** 0.13** -0.078 -0.13* 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.31*** 0.17*** 
 (4.05) (4.61) (4.54) (5.50) (3.28) (-0.96) (-2.26) (4.73) (4.02) (4.69) (5.07) (8.04) (4.09) 
GDP  0.081** 0.091** 0.10** 0.051 0.0088 0.016 -0.047 0.097** 0.062* -0.015 -0.0053 0.12*** 0.080* 
 (2.59) (2.88) (3.13) (1.33) (0.27) (0.27) (-0.84) (2.95) (1.96) (-0.52) (-0.18) (3.92) (2.55) 
PR  -0.050 -0.054 -0.095** -0.021 -0.071* 0.12* 0.26*** -0.062 -0.046 -0.047 -0.028 -0.083* -0.046 
 (-1.44) (-1.56) (-2.68) (-0.45) (-2.02) (2.15) (6.46) (-1.78) (-1.34) (-1.58) (-0.86) (-2.48) (-1.32) 
Mixed  -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.30*** -0.076 -0.30*** -0.26*** -0.087 -0.30*** -0.27*** -0.20*** -0.26*** -0.23*** -0.27*** 
 (-6.93) (-7.13) (-7.65) (-1.82) (-7.69) (-4.90) (-1.91) (-7.49) (-6.87) (-6.02) (-6.72) (-6.46) (-6.87) 
Urban  -1.3e-09*            
  (-2.45)            
Openness   -0.0022           
   (-1.49)           
Inc, ineq.     -0.0051***          
    (-3.83)          
Fam. farms     -0.0031***         
     (-3.68)         
Union den.      0.00065        
      (0.67)        
Left        0.20***       
       (7.46)       
Inter-state war.         -0.088*      
        (-2.56)      
Civil war         -0.19***     
         (-5.12)     
Corruption          -2.74***    
          (-29.45)    
Imp. Admin.            0.28***   
           (19.09)   
Women pol.             1.81***  
            (25.12)  
Civil society              -0.058 
             (-0.68) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7137 6986 6987 4447 6981 1994 2604 6779 7122 7137 7137 6435 7137 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Appendix A7: Replicating core heterogeneity tests (from Table 
4 in paper) for alternative welfare measures 
 
Table A28. Party institutionalization on coverage of major welfare risks (Encompassingness; SPAW) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample: Autocratic Democratic Western 
countries 
Non-western 
countries 
Low rural 
inequality 
High rural 
inequality 
Party Institut. 0.0088 1.40
*** 1.39*** 0.28*** 0.86*** 0.052 
 (0.10) (7.65) (6.81) (3.69) (7.87) (0.51) 
Population (ln) 0.65*** 1.19*** 1.11*** 0.61*** 1.03*** 0.57*** 
 (7.43) (16.71) (8.91) (10.79) (13.70) (6.33) 
GDP p.c. (ln) -0.074 -0.18* 0.16 0.20*** 0.53*** -0.24** 
 (-1.80) (-2.50) (1.55) (5.06) (10.91) (-3.18) 
PR 0.41*** 0.87*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.21*** 0.73*** 
 (8.81) (12.26) (7.05) (13.45) (5.00) (15.44) 
Mixed 0.54*** 0.60*** 0.63*** 0.43*** 0.11 0.62*** 
 (9.00) (5.05) (6.12) (8.66) (1.88) (9.30) 
Polyarchy   -1.26*** -0.19* -0.42*** -0.48*** 
   (-7.91) (-2.48) (-4.86) (-4.57) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3378 2767 1558 4596 3596 2474 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A29. Testing for heterogeneity: Party institutionalization and SPAW Universalism Index  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample: Autocratic Democratic Western 
countries 
Non-western 
countries 
Low rural 
inequality 
High rural 
inequality 
Party Institut. 1.07
** 1.28 6.97*** 1.57*** 2.29*** 3.59*** 
 (2.66) (0.85) (3.66) (3.78) (4.19) (5.91) 
Population (ln) 1.53*** 3.19*** 1.62 0.98** 0.90 -2.50*** 
 (3.34) (4.85) (1.25) (2.63) (1.38) (-4.35) 
GDP p.c. (ln) -0.0037 1.92** 4.84*** 0.072 2.11*** -2.65*** 
 (-0.02) (2.71) (4.51) (0.31) (8.00) (-5.42) 
PR 0.40* -0.039 -1.75* 0.69*** 1.09*** 0.44 
 (1.96) (-0.07) (-2.30) (3.33) (3.56) (1.52) 
Mixed 2.22*** 1.14 -1.76 2.59*** 0.58 1.66*** 
 (6.47) (1.26) (-1.95) (8.09) (1.13) (3.47) 
Polyarchy   -6.88*** 1.89*** -0.85 0.084 
   (-4.34) (4.26) (-1.43) (0.13) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2524 1646 820 3352 2245 1855 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A30. Testing for heterogeneity: Party institutionalization and Public Goods (v2dlencmps; V-Dem)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample: Autocratic Democratic Western 
countries 
Non-western 
countries 
Low rural 
inequality 
High rural 
inequality 
Party Institut. 1.12
*** 1.68*** 1.19*** 1.17*** 1.53*** 1.32*** 
 (11.19) (12.88) (7.98) (13.94) (15.35) (11.33) 
Population (ln) -0.015 -0.33*** -0.44*** 0.41*** 0.012 0.12 
 (-0.18) (-6.21) (-4.82) (6.99) (0.21) (1.34) 
GDP p.c. (ln) -0.070 0.095* 0.36*** 0.028 0.17*** -0.0049 
 (-1.68) (2.06) (4.33) (0.83) (4.41) (-0.08) 
PR -0.059 0.068 -0.073 -0.13** -0.20*** -0.045 
 (-1.21) (1.51) (-1.46) (-3.06) (-4.31) (-0.91) 
Mixed -0.15** -0.086 -0.19** -0.25*** -0.12* -0.54*** 
 (-2.70) (-1.67) (-3.06) (-5.57) (-2.18) (-9.37) 
Polyarchy   1.24*** 0.37*** 0.76*** 0.16 
   (10.32) (4.98) (8.53) (1.61) 
Country 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3981 3137 1718 5419 4167 2885 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix A8: Tests using alternative PI measure, omitting 
party linkages indicator 
 
Table A31. Version of Party Institutionalization calculated without v2psprlnks regressed on various welfare measures 
 SPAW V-Dem SPAW SCIP ILO 
 Encompassingness Universalism Universalism RR Coverage Social Exp, 
Level/Change L L C L L C L L L L 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PI reduced 0.10*** 0.090*** 0.018* 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.043*** 0.41*** 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.29 
(- v2psprlnks) (7.33) (5.98) (2.44) (28.77) (17.32) (7.40) (5.07) (5.74) (4.38) (0.76) 
PR   -0.43*** -0.0066  0.36*** 0.012 0.91* -0.40** -0.24 2.56* 
  (-6.08) (-0.21)  (5.39) (0.50) (2.28) (-2.80) (-1.59) (2.23) 
Mixed el. sys.  1.19*** 0.23***  0.15*** -0.0058 0.86** -0.17* -0.032 -4.37*** 
  (27.29) (9.93)  (3.73) (-0.43) (2.70) (-2.09) (-0.29) (-5.35) 
Polyarchy  0.17*** 0.058***  0.24*** 0.0012 0.40 0.0046 0.24*** 1.12 
  (4.72) (3.46)  (8.31) (0.12) (1.77) (0.09) (4.36) (1.35) 
Pop. (ln)  0.56*** 0.071***  0.12** 0.044*** 0.67*** 0.18** -0.020 -0.95 
  (16.13) (4.14)  (3.10) (3.52) (3.34) (2.66) (-0.43) (-1.63) 
GDP p.c. (ln)   0.52*** 0.040*  -
0.15*** 
-0.0079 2.09*** 0.15* 0.0083 -1.53** 
  (11.29) (1.97)  (-4.00) (-0.60) (7.10) (2.15) (0.13) (-2.89) 
Dep. Var.t-1   -0.17***   -
0.085*** 
    
   (-
17.40) 
  (-
14.18) 
    
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9004 6110 6065 16218 7093 7080 4152 263 267 781 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix A9: Placebo tests 
 
Table A32. Placebo tests on v2dlunivl (from V-Dem) 
Dep var. Military Expenditure 
 (% of GDP) 
Expenditures for Public Order 
(% of GDP)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party Institut. -1.01** 0.16 0.13 -0.0051* -0.0015 0.00034 
 (-2.81) (0.39) (0.50) (-2.38) (-0.63) (0.17) 
Polyarchy  -1.62*** -0.19  -0.0023 -0.0015 
  (-5.80) (-0.82)  (-0.94) (-0.67) 
Population  -0.013 0.11  -0.0093** -0.00023 
  (-0.04) (0.43)  (-2.70) (-0.08) 
GDP  0.25 0.42  -0.0039*** -0.00090 
  (0.68) (1.45)  (-4.35) (-1.24) 
PR  -0.089 -0.34*  0.0026** 0.00039 
  (-0.37) (-2.25)  (2.74) (0.46) 
Mixed  0.17 -0.078  0.0023 0.00017 
  (1.35) (-0.81)  (1.55) (0.16) 
Lvd   -0.37***   -0.37*** 
   (-4.26)   (-8.23) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3028 1919 1763 854 721 623 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix A10: Additional tests for heterogeneity 
 
Table A33. Party institutionalization and universalism (v2dlunivl from V-Dem), split sample according to income inequality 
Gini coefficients. 
 (1) (2) 
 High Inequality Low  
Inequality 
Party institutionalization 1.21*** 1.99*** 
 (14.63) (11.78) 
Population  0.37*** 0.20* 
 (4.85) (2.19) 
GDP  0.13* 1.07*** 
 (2.06) (13.88) 
PR 0.11** 0.68*** 
 (2.86) (14.16) 
Mixed 0.070 -0.30*** 
 (1.82) (-4.69) 
Country FE  Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Observations 4893 2235 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A34. Party institutionalization and universalism (v2dlunivl: V-Dem). Interaction specifications. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Rural inequality Income inequality Western vs other countries 
Party inst. 1.97*** 1.39** 0.89*** 
 (8.09) (2.79) (6.09) 
Fam. Farms 0.0042   
 (1.41)   
Party inst.*Fam. farms 0.0014   
 (0.33)   
Income ineq.  -0.034**  
  (-2.70)  
Party inst.*Income ineq.   0.018  
  (1.18)  
West   -6.97*** 
   (-27.87) 
Western dummy*Party inst.   4.39*** 
   (20.91) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2199 2235 2235 
T-values (in parentheses) calculated with panel corrected standard errors. Constant, year- and country-fixed effects, and 
controls (GDP [Log], population [Log], Polyarchy index, electoral system dummies) omitted from table. * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A35. Party institutionalization on universalism (v2dlunivl from V-Dem), omitting regions from sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Region 
excluded 
All 
include
d 
East. 
Europ
e 
Lat. 
Amer. 
MEN
A 
Sub-
Sa. 
Africa. 
West East. 
Asia 
South-
East 
Asia 
South 
Asia 
Pacific Caribbea
n 
Party instit.  0.96*** 0.96*** 1.75*** 1.38*** 1.40*** 0.98*** 1.31*** 1.22*** 1.39*** 1.30*** 1.29*** 
 (12.30) (12.30) (19.50
) 
(16.08) (14.21
) 
(11.94
) 
(16.22
) 
(14.98
) 
(17.01
) 
(16.23
) 
(16.10) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation
s 
6394 6394 5739 6497 5490 5419 6913 6766 6859 7137 7019 
T-values calculated with panel corrected standard errors. Constant, fixed time, country effects and controls (GDP [Log], 
population [Log] electoral rules, and Polyarchy) excluded. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A36. Party institutionalization on various welfare state measures, with sample restricted to Latin American countries 
 V-Dem universalism SPAW 
encompassingness 
SPAW universalism 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party instit. 0.82*** 0.21 0.20* 0.32** 1.29** 4.80*** 
 (7.71) (1.43) (2.01) (2.61) (2.64) (5.82) 
Polyarchy  0.46**  -0.30**  -0.070 
  (3.29)  (-2.58)  (-0.09) 
Population  0.80***  -0.17  -1.19 
  (6.51)  (-1.45)  (-1.28) 
GDP  -0.87***  -0.46***  -4.12*** 
  (-7.77)  (-5.48)  (-6.47) 
PR  0.49***  0.74***  0.0027 
  (6.03)  (12.88)  (0.01) 
Mixed  0.37***  0.36***  2.66*** 
  (4.45)  (5.35)  (6.88) 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2159 1398 1838 1257 1377 999 
T-values calculated with panel corrected standard errors.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
